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RÉSUMÉ/ABSTRACT 
 
Cette recherche offre quelques explications au sujet des écarts de salaires entre les 
immigrants et les Canadiens à l’aide de donnés des recensements Canadiens.  Nous 
étudions les sources de cet écart en mesurant les rendements à l'éducation en prenant en 
compte les effets de diplômes. Le texte présente évidence d'une valorisation différenciée 
des immigrants sur le marché du travail selon leur région d'origine. On trouve que le 
marché du travail pénalise spécialement les immigrants provenant des régions d’origine 
non traditionnelles comme l’Asie et l’Amérique Latine. En plus, le rendement à 
l’expérience du travail au Canada semble s'améliorer pour les immigrants récents mais 
les rendements à l’expérience du travail à l’étranger sont très bas. Nos résultats indiquent 
aussi que le rendement d’une année d'instruction au Canada est inférieur pour les 
immigrants que pour les Canadiens. Cependant, pour les immigrants le rendement d’une 
année d'instruction à l’étranger est similaire au rendement d’une année d'instruction au 
Canada. Finalement, on observe que les effets des diplômes universitaires sont plus 
importants pour les immigrants.  
 
This research offers evidence about the wage differentials between immigrants 
and Canadians using the Canadians censuses. We investigate the sources of this wage 
differential by estimating returns to schooling, taking into account sheepskin effects. The 
paper presents evidence of a differentiated labor market valuation of immigrants 
according to their region of origin. We find that the Canadian labor market specially 
penalizes immigrants from non-traditional source regions like Asia and Latin America. 
Additionally, we observe improvements in the returns to Canadian working experience 
for recent cohorts of immigration. However, the immigrants’ returns to foreign 
experience are remarkably small. Furthermore, our results indicate that the return to one 
more year of Canadian schooling is smaller for immigrants than for native-born. In 
addition, immigrants’ returns to foreign schooling seem to be similar to immigrants’ 
return to Canadian schooling. Finally we observe that sheepskin effects have larger 
returns for immigrants than for native-born the higher the diplomas.  
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
Immigration is an important issue for Canada. The government has several reasons to 
promote it. On the one hand, the ageing of working population is augmenting. On the 
other hand, the fertility rates are small. Dolin and Young (2004) report a 36 percent 
increase of the population between 45 and 64 years of age from 1991 to 2001 and a 
fertility rate of 1.51 children per family in 2001. Under these conditions they point out 
deaths will surpass births in 20 years. Hence, Canada is in a position where it needs to 
increase immigration to keep its labor market working. As a result of this challenge they 
say the economic component of Canada's immigration program looks for immigrants in 
different ways, among which the skilled worker class is an important group, to fulfill the 
needs of Canadian labor market. According to Grant and Sweetman (2004) the 2001 
Census reports 5.4 million foreign-born persons, that represent about 18.4 percent of the 
total population. However, despite these facts, Grant and Sweetman (2004) argue that 
there are at least three characteristics of recent immigration that concerns policy makers 
and researchers. Firstly, they point out its urban nature contrary to the rural nature of 
earlier decades; Secondly, the changes in demographic characteristics due to 
modifications of the immigration policy which has resulted in an increase of immigrants 
coming from non-traditional source countries but also in an increase of human capital 
endowments; Finally, they say that immigrants have suffered a deterioration in their labor 
market assimilation compared to earlier cohorts. Moreover, Reitz (2005) calls attention to 
the fact that since Canada has moved towards a knowledge-based economy there is 
especial interest in the “[...] effective use of immigrants’ skills in the changing labor 
market [...]” (Reitz, 2005, p.2). In order to meet this objective, in the case of skilled 
worker class, there exists a point accumulation method to assess the qualifications of the 
applicants with a maximum score of 100 points and a current pass mark of 671. Within 
this assessment, education, language proficiency and work experience have an important 
share of all the points2. The reason is to attract individuals who can meet the labor market 
requirements and have a successful integration to Canada. Thus, the system is supposed 
                                                 
1 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/assess/index.html 
2 Ibidem. 
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to attract immigrants with outstanding skills that will allow them to pass the mark. 
Nonetheless, there are other components of the immigration program that do not have the 
same goal but humanitarian purposes and might not attract skilled immigrants. For 
instance, in the case of refugees Riddell and Ferrer (2004) mention that selection bias 
could be in the worst case negative if conditions in source countries do not allow an 
efficient human capital accumulation. Even with these different components of the 
immigration system Green and Worswick (2004) present evidence of similar assimilation 
patterns from different visa group immigrants. Furthermore, Baker and Benjamin (1994) 
and Bloom, Grenier and Gunderson (1995) show evidence concerning the worsening in 
the assimilation of the most recent cohorts of immigrants. More recently, Reitz (2005) 
and Alboim, Finnie and Meng (2005) among others, call attention to the fact that 
immigrants coming with foreign education earn less than Canadians with the same 
credentials. Additionally, Reitz (2005) indicates that despite the fact that recent cohorts of 
immigrants have, in average, higher credentials relative to native-born Canadians, a 
downward earnings trend persists, especially for non traditional source countries. 
Furthermore, Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) shows that additionally to the deterioration in 
immigrants’ earnings due to the shifts in region of origin, the declines in returns to 
foreign experience explain notably this deterioration. These results are perturbing, 
especially since there is an important amount of immigrants coming as skilled workers 
and the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act emphasizes on human capital 
Tolley (2003). 
Looking at all these facts, the question concerning the causes of male immigrant 
wage deterioration relative to male native-born Canadians seems important to us. 
Therefore, this research will attempt to provide evidence regarding to what extent, 
education and experience of immigrants are valued relative to native-born in the 
Canadian labor market. Particularly, we will focus on the role of schooling and diplomas. 
The study will also examine the role of the region of origin in the remuneration of 
immigrants. Finally, we will inspect the return to Canadian experience for both groups 
(immigrants and native-born). We believe that if there are information asymmetries in 
labor market and employers are not familiar with or do not recognize experience, 
schooling and diplomas of the immigrants, there will be immigrants receiving smaller 
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wages than their Canadian counterparts. The failure in the recognition of foreign 
education and experience by the labor market can complicate the job search in the new 
country as it will be harder for immigrants to prove their skills to potential employers. In 
some cases this can lead immigrants to accept jobs for which they are overqualified or to 
accept jobs different from their area of expertise due to legal restrictions in certain areas.        
Additionally, if years of education have a different value for the labor market than 
diplomas and there are asymmetries in the labor market, it is reasonable to suppose 
different rewards for immigrants’ educational attainment and credentials. Finally, we try 
to see if immigrants that come from countries not sharing similar background with 
Canada will find it more difficult to integrate into the labor market. It is reasonable to 
consider that immigrants coming from countries with dissimilar political and economic 
institutions and economic development will find it harder to adapt to the Canadian 
society and to enter into the labor market successfully.  
In order to carry out this research, we use a regression analysis using a variation 
of the Mincer log-wage equation to estimate returns to education and experience. The 
sample for the study is composed by fulltime-working permanent residents and native-
born males from pooled data of the 1991, 1996 and 2001 Public User Micro Files of the 
Canadian censuses. We find that returns to Canadian experience are lower for male 
immigrants than for male native-born. Additionally, we observe foreign experience has a 
trivial value relative to Canadian experience. What is more, our results let us see that 
while immigrants’ returns to Canadian schooling are lower relative to native-born, 
sheepskin effects are larger for immigrants. Regarding immigrants’ returns to foreign 
schooling, we come across evidence that supports these are similar to the immigrants’ 
returns to Canadian schooling. Moreover, our outcome shows us cohort deterioration 
with some recovery for the most recent cohort (1995-2000). Finally, our results also 
indicate that shifts in region of origin plays an important role in the deterioration of 
immigrants’ wages. 
Understanding of how the labor market rewards immigrants’ characteristics 
relative to Canadian is essential for understanding the problems that immigrants have to 
face in order to integrate to Canadian society. In this sense, this paper adheres to the 
effort of the current Canadian immigration literature for increasing the knowledge about 
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immigrant returns to schooling and experience. Nevertheless, our study has limitations. 
On the one hand, a difficulty arises in evaluating the returns to schooling and experience 
by class of immigrant since the Canadian census lacks variables with detailed information 
regarding immigrant class. For this reason, the analysis focuses only on male permanent 
residents and native-born Canadians. A second limitation comes from the fact of using 
public user data files, which confines to some extent our sample and the detail of the 
variables. Nonetheless, we consider that the results presented here are relevant and   
provide useful information for further studies on this matter. The following paper is 
divided as follows: Section 2 revises previous articles; Section 3 summarizes the theory 
behind returns to education; Section 4 clarifies the estimation approach; Section 5 gives a 
basic descriptive analysis of the data; Section 6 explains the results of the econometric 
analysis and finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions.     
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
There is numerous literature concerning immigrants' earnings profile and assimilation to 
host country, especially addressing the United States. Among this vast literature, the 
seminal paper of Chiswick (1978) regarding the earnings of foreign-born men in the US 
labor market is an important point of reference regarding immigrants’ returns to 
schooling and experience. Chiswick’s cross-section analysis studies the effects of foreign 
birth and the length of time in the host country on the earnings of immigrants based on 
the human capital earning function developed by Mincer (1974). Chiswick (1978) finds 
that immigrants’ earnings growth is fairly high and estimates an overtaking time period 
between 10 and 15 years for immigrants to catch up native earnings. In his research 
Chiswick establishes the common model based on Mincer’s theory that later on is used 
and modified at some extent by Borjas (1985, 1995), which questions the empirical 
soundness of using only one cross-section analysis. In turn, Borjas develops a well 
known cohort analysis using data from different censuses and a modified version of 
Chiswick’s specification. Results from Borjas show that cross-section approach 
overestimates the earnings growth and do not take into account the immigrant quality 
deterioration between cohorts.  
 4
Regarding Canada, there is growing empirical literature to unveil the causes of 
wage disparity between immigrants and Canadians. Covering the period from the postwar 
to the beginning of the seventies Abbott and Beach (1993) examine the evolution of 
immigrant earnings differentials.  They use the 1973 Job Mobility Survey, which due to 
the direct measure of experience, allows them to use age of individuals to measure birth- 
year effects. This permits measuring the differences of earnings-experience and earnings-
years-since-migration between birth cohorts as well as analyzing the role of a direct 
measure of experience in the earnings for both male native-born Canadians and 
immigrants. Their results indicate that earnings differentials between immigrants and 
native-born Canadians started to amplify in the middle of the 1960’s due to a lower 
assimilation-earnings profile and a decreasing earnings-experience profile together with 
an increase in native-born Canadians earnings profile.  
For their part, Baker and Benjamin (1994) examine the assimilation of immigrants 
during the 1970’s and 1980’s using the 1971, 1981 and 1986 Canadian censuses. The 
analysis they perform to calculate the differences across and within cohorts use estimates 
of cross-section regressions, which permits parameters to be different for each year, 
contrasting with pooled regressions. Furthermore, the use of three censuses allows them 
to obtain two pairs of assimilation estimates and examine the stability of the assimilation 
profile throughout the 1970-1985 period. They find small immigrant assimilation all over 
the three censuses. What is more, they find that many arrival cohorts do not present 
earnings growth. In the case of earlier cohorts the low assimilation rate is explained by 
the small earnings gap. However, unlike the earlier cohorts which had smaller entry 
earnings differences relative to native-born, the recent cohorts enter with lower entry 
earnings but do not present higher assimilation rates. Alternatively, with a different 
model specification, Bloom, Gernier and Gunderson (1995) use pooled data from same 
censuses and arrive to similar results to Baker and Benjamin (1994). Nonetheless, the 
analysis of Bloom, Gernier and Gunderson (1995) shows more clearly the effects of 
source country composition changes in the entry and assimilation profiles. These authors 
observe the entry effects being substantially more negative for non-traditional source 
countries than for traditional ones even though for both groups of countries there is a 
decreasing assimilation pattern for recent cohorts. However, they also calculate that 
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immigrants of post-1970 cohorts from non-traditional sources will never catch up with 
native-born wages in a reasonable amount of time compared to the pre-1970 cohorts that 
completed assimilation within fifteen years. Results from their estimates of the 1971 
cohort are similar to those obtained by Abbott and Beach (1993) for 1973, as well as the 
worsening position tendency of recent immigrants found by Baker and Benjamin (1994).  
In a different manner, Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) use a two step procedure 
for several cross-section analysis of the 1986, 1991 and 1996 censuses to investigate if 
earnings differences between immigrants and native-born Canadians of the same age (and 
other similar characteristics) are a function immigrants’ age at immigration. Concerning 
education, they detect that immigrants arriving at younger ages have similar returns to 
schooling than native-born while for older immigrants the returns diminish. However, if 
immigrants’ schooling is measured as Canadian and foreign, they notice that although 
there are similar returns for both (Canadian and foreign schooling), these are vaguely 
smaller than the returns to schooling for native-born Canadians. Moreover, they notice 
that the age of immigration has an important impact on the acculturation of visible 
minorities with a mother language different to English. For instance, they observe 
immigrants that arrived at around the age of 15 and 18 have a smaller amount of 
schooling years than immigrants that arrived at younger or older ages. Finally, regarding 
work experience, they observe returns to foreign experience are insignificant for 
immigrants.  
Alternatively, Green and Worswick (2003, 2004) carry out two analyses using the 
Immigrant Database (IMDB) and a series of surveys of Consumer Finance (SCF) from 
the years 1981, 1982, 1984-1997. To undergo the analysis the authors create and organize 
cohorts to reflect the conditions of the economy and immigration policy. In the case of 
the immigrants’ sample, they can define cohorts by education level since the IMDB is a 
panel that links education at arrival and earnings. However, the SCF does not permit to 
do this. Therefore, they restrict the analysis to males between 25 and 64 years of age, 
who are considered to have completed their education and entered the labor market. In 
their first analysis Green and Worswick (2003) try to measure the importance of cohort 
and macroeconomic effects in the presence of human capital investment. Since human 
capital theory predicts lower entry wages and higher earnings growth, they try to measure 
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net present values for different cohorts using the “overtaking” tool from Mincer (1974). 
While they find important decreases in entry earnings from the 1980’s and a faster 
decrease during the 1990’s, macroeconomic conditions do not help to explain this 
decrease completely. When comparing with native-born Canadians cohorts of new labor 
market entrants, they find that macroeconomic conditions explain about 50 percent of the 
cross cohort decrease. Additionally, the use of net present values shows that immigrants 
in the nineties are not a lot worse than immigrants from the eighties. However, they 
identify like Bloom, Gernier and Gunderson (1995) and Baker and Benjamin (1994) that 
changes in composition of source countries have an important role in the earnings 
decrease, thus in the net present values. In their second analysis, using the same sample, 
Green and Worswick (2004) investigate the sources of the fall in entry earnings for 
Canadians and immigrants. They consider that by estimating the earnings differential for 
immigrants and Canadians that entered to the labor market at the same time, they will be 
able to remove the effects of Canadian economy affecting both groups. The purpose of 
doing this is to corroborate the wage differences among native-born Canadians and 
immigrants once changes in Canadian economy are taken into account. One advantage of 
the data they use over the census data is that it contains an immigrant visa group variable. 
So, the authors break down the data by visa group and country of origin. Differentiating 
by type of visa, they test if the point system criterion has any effect in the wage 
differential. Since the point system criterion has the objective of selecting individuals by 
their skills and adaptability to Canada, it should make it easier to the immigrants accepted 
through this method to transfer their human capital. They find that the general trend is 
similar to the other class of immigrants. Like in their previous study they discover that an 
important decrease in wages is related to the country of origin. Green and Worswick 
(2004) conclude that eighty percent of the fall in entry earnings can be explained by the 
effect of new entrants (36 percent), changes in the composition of source countries (30 
percent) and a decrease in the returns to foreign experience (15 percent).  
Further, Frenette and Morissette (2003) use censuses from 1981, 1986, 1991, 
1996 and 2001 and the same methods of Baker and Benjamin (1994) and Grant (1999) to 
examine what would be necessary for recent immigrants’ cohort to achieve wage 
convergence with native-born. Their data show increasing earnings deterioration during 
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the 1980’s that stopped between 1990 and 1995. They show also a restarting of the 
decrease and in 1995 where immigrants show 45 percent lower earnings. Nevertheless, 
they detect that between 1996 and 2000 the relative entry earnings improved and by 2000 
they moved back to the mid-1980’s value. Contrasting Bloom, Gernier and Gunderson 
(1995), Frenette and Morissette (2003) find that immigrants’ wages from the 1975-1979 
cohort converge almost to the native-born Canadians’ wages after fifteen years after the 
arrival year while for immigrants from the eighties there still is a large wage difference 
after 15 years. What is more, they explain that unless immigrants’ cohorts from the 
nineties experience a high wage growth rate it will take longer time to converge with 
their native-born counterparts. Alternatively, Warman and Worswick (2004) using the 
same censuses as Frenette and Morissette (2003), study the earnings performance of 
immigrants in urban areas from a completely different approach. They use mostly 
graphics and wage mean values to carry out their study. Like previous studies, they find 
that immigrants’ relative earnings of more recent cohorts decline for all the cities they 
study. Moreover, they observe that when comparing with native-born Canadians, 
economic integration of immigrants in urban areas is lower. Nevertheless, they find a 
turnaround for men from the 1996-2000 cohort, which present higher earnings than the 
1991-195 cohort in the first five years after arrival.                 
  From a different stance, Ferrer and Riddell (2004) explore how the Canadian 
labor market rewards the education and skills of immigrants. They include both, the 
contribution of diplomas and education attainment in the wage analysis, conversely to 
other studies that use just one of these variables. With this approach, they seek to separate 
the effect of program completion from the effect of years of schooling. Furthermore, they 
use age at immigration to distinguish between Canadian and foreign education. Ferrer 
and Riddell (2004) use a sample of full time male workers by pooling the 1981, 1986, 
1991 and 1996 censuses. Their study shows that immigrants’ schooling years and 
experience are rewarded less than those of native-born Canadians. Surprisingly, they 
discover that immigrant credentials are equally valued and sometimes more valued than 
Canadian credentials. Regarding the effects of region of origin they show that the returns 
to education and to credentials change according to the region. For example, for 
individuals coming form England/United States and Africa the returns are similar to 
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native born Canadians but for immigrants from Europe, South America and Asia they 
find that education is largely discounted whereas degrees are not.  
From the same perspective of Ferrer and Riddell (2004), Alboim, Finnie and 
Meng (2005) use the Literacy Skills Used in Daily Activities database for 1989 to 
uncover the effects of foreign and Canadian education on immigrants’ wages. The main 
advantage of this database compared to the census data used by Ferrer and Riddell (2004) 
is that it has direct measures of foreign and Canadian schooling as well as individual 
reading tests in English and French. Furthermore, the database allows them to separate 
foreign from Canadian working experience. They find that after controlling for explicit 
measures of foreign and Canadian education and experience the entry wage gap between 
native-born Canadians and immigrants practically disappears. Moreover, they notice that 
foreign experience and foreign education are highly discounted, especially for non-white 
minorities. Nonetheless, they observe that when using a sheepskin effects approach; 
immigrants with a foreign degree that obtain a Canadian degree receive similar returns 
compared to their native-born counterparts. According to them, this particular finding 
seems to show that a Canadian diploma serves to make a foreign credential more 
meaningful. Then again, Sweetman (2004) carries out another effort to disclose the way 
Canadian labor market rewards the immigrants’ skills from a slightly different angle. 
Sweetman (2004) uses the censuses of 1986, 1991 and 1996. Moreover, he takes into 
account the sheepskin approach used by Ferrer and Riddell (2004). However, he includes 
a variable referring to the quality of immigrants’ education in their source countries. In 
order to do that he uses an average score from Hanushek and Kimko (2000). This average 
score is derived from the data of international standardized tests that are used to measure 
quality of education. By using this variable, he finds that immigrants coming from 
countries with poorer quality of education receive lower returns to education and 
experience than immigrants coming form countries with better quality of education. 
Additionally, he observes that education at the source country does not affect the returns 
of immigrants entering to Canada at a young age and who completed their education in 
Canada. More recently, Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) carry out a cohort study for 
estimating the deterioration of entry earnings of immigrants. In their study they pool data 
from the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001 Canadian censuses. One of the remarkable 
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parts of this study lies in the specifications to be estimated. Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) 
start estimating earnings equations comparable to those of Bloom, Gernier and 
Gunderson (1995). However, with the aim to disentangle the interpretation of years since 
migration variable, they split the variables regarding immigrants’ years of schooling and 
years of experience into their Canadian and foreign components. Thus, creating four 
variables they have the flexibility to isolate each effect. Furthermore, they use provincial 
unemployment rates interacted with immigration dummy instead of common fixed year 
effects to capture for current period effects. Their results are in line with those of Alboim, 
Finnie and Meng (2005), Ferrer and Riddell (2004), and Sweetman (2004) among others, 
which suggest that declines in return to foreign experience (between one quarter and one 
half) and shifts in the country of origin (one third) explain an important part of the 
deterioration in immigrant entry earnings.  
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
In this section we will give a synopsis of the common knowledge among economists 
regarding returns to schooling. With that purpose in mind we will follow and summarize 
Ehrenberg (2004), Pons (2004), Card (2000) and Willis (1986) who have a complete 
review of the underlying theory and some econometric issues behind our research.  
 
3.1. Returns to schooling 
 
Ehrenberg (2004) says investments in education and training are known as human capital. 
This human capital has, like physical capital, a value in the market. Ehrenberg (2004) 
explain Labor economics analyzes why people under the same circumstances invest 
different quantities in human capital and how the market rewards this investment. On the 
one hand, human capital investments involve two major costs for a person: direct costs 
and opportunity costs. The first represents the financial investment dedicated to studies, 
like tuition fees, money spent on books and tools; the second represents the money a 
person stops receiving for the hours  he spends studying. On the other hand, a person that 
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invests in human capital expects a benefit through a higher stream of future earnings, thus 
expecting higher returns for their investment relative to someone that has lower human 
capital. But for these higher earnings to happen, Willis (1986) says that more schooled 
persons should be significantly more productive and that on a long-run equilibrium the 
schooling-earnings link would imply that anyone will have incentive to change his 
schooling level. However, Willis (1986) states that among human capital literature it is 
difficult to stick to full theoretical considerations since these can sometimes represent 
difficulties for applied analysis under limited data and econometric methodologies. 
Bearing this in mind, we follow Pons (2004) to derive the human capital investment 
model developed by Becker (1964). For simplification purposes Pons (2004) considers 
that investment is done in a unique period and that benefits are collected in a stream 
period of time.  
According to Pons (2004), a person that chooses at a certain age an activity X 
which needs certain amount of schooling will have, after subtracting the tuition costs of 
the first period, a net earning stream of . The present value of this stream is: nxxxx ...,, 321
∑
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with i being a fix discount rate. If  there is another activity Z, which does not require any 
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Recalling that X has costs only for the first period, Pons (2004) says that the cost 
from choosing X instead of Z can be expressed as the difference from the net earnings 
from the first period C=x0-z0 while the benefits R can be expressed as the net present 
value of the differences in net earnings for the following periods kn=xn- zn (with n=1, 
2,...N). Hence, we can write the benefit from choosing X as: 
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Like any other investment decision, a person will compare the net present value of 
benefits with the costs. So, a person that is thinking about an additional year of schooling 
will compare the present value of his net future benefits with the costs of such 
investment. He will only invest if the present value of the benefits is larger than the costs, 
consequently a persons’ investment decision will be based on the sign of d. If d is 
positive (d>0) he will invest in education whereas if d is negative (d<0) he will not.   
Pons (2004) points out that another method to assess if investing in education is 
profitable is to write the equation with equality and look for the internal rate of return: 
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Lastly, since , she arrives to the following expression: ),...2,1( Nnkzx nn =+=
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which uses as a way to correct for the fact that life has a limited amount of 
years.  In this case Pons (2004) explains that the investment decision depends on the 
internal rate of return and the discount rate. If the internal rate of return is higher than the 
discount rate, then the person will choose to X whereas if the internal rate of return is 
lower he will choose Z. 
Nr −+ )1(
Later, with the aim of making empirically measurable the return to schooling,                    
Mincer (1974) develops a human capital earnings function of the form:  
2log iii dXcXbSy +++= α  
where y is a measure of earnings, S is schooling years and X is years of potential 
experience which for data limitations is usually calculated as X=age-S-6. Willis(1986) 
calls attention to the fact that Mincer’s earnings function offers an estimate of the 
schooling internal rate of return “[…]only if it is assumed[…]that a given increment in 
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schooling has the same proportional effect on earnings at all levels of experience[…]” 
Willis (1986). However, Willis (1986) indicates that if this is not the case, Mincer (1974) 
proposes a technique to avoid numerical methods which uses the concept of “overtaking 
experience”. What is more, this overtaking experience is less than or equal to the 
reciprocal of the internal rate of return to schooling according to Mincer (1974). Yet, 
from this human capital earnings model Card (2000) argues that maximizing earnings net 
present value to reach an optimal schooling decision by matching costs and benefits is 
appropriate if people face a fix interest rate and are indifferent between working and 
going to school. But in a more general way, Card (2000) says, variations arise in the 
optimal schooling decision between individuals since they most likely have different 
talent and preferences towards school and working. Therefore, Card (2000) presents, 
from a theoretical and empirical perspective, a model that takes into account some of the 
problems Griliches (1977) identifies in the empirical literature, like ability bias, 
measurement errors and interpretation of coefficients, which we will explain in the 
following paragraphs. For this purpose we summarize a simplified version of Card’s 
model from Oreopoulos (2004) and later extend the explanations using Card (2000).  
Oreopoulos (2004) assumes individuals have an infinite planning horizon starting 
at and a lifecycle utility function: 0=t
∫∞ −= 0 ))(())(,( dtetcutcSV tρ  
where utility depends on consumption c(t) at period t, )(•U  being a concave increasing 
function, assuming that individuals use a subjective discount rate ρ  and that they take a 
unique decision regarding when to stop studying. This utility function is subject to a 
budget constraint: 
R
eSydteSydtetc
RSRt
s
Rt −−∞−∞ == ∫∫ )()()(0  
where  is the earnings function of an individual with S years of schooling. In order 
to simplify, he assumes that schooling is additively separable in age so he can ignore 
earnings growth from post-schooling investments. Additionally, he assumes the 
individual faces a fix interest rate R. Given that the model only considers that the 
)(Sy
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individual will choose a level of education to maximize his income, the first order 
conditions can be written as: 
0)(')( =+−
−−
R
eSy
R
eSRy
RSRS
 
This expression can be reduced to: 
R
Sy
Sy =
)(
)('  
Here )()(' SySy  is the marginal internal rate of return to schooling and R represents the 
marginal cost of the investment. Then, Oreopoulos (2004) postulates that first order 
conditions reveal that individuals will invest in education until marginal return from this 
investment is equal to the interest rate. He defines as well the human capital production 
function Mincer (1974) proposes  where, according to Willis (1986),  
represents a parameter of basic earnings capacity for individual i , and  represents 
parameter of learning skills that allows individual i  to increase his productivity during 
school. Thus, after taking logarithms and using the first order conditions Oreopoulos 
obtains: 
Sba iieSy +=)( ia
ib
RSaSbSy iii +=+= α)(log  
Rb
Sy
Sy
i ==)(
)('  
The problem with this function, as Willis (1986) says referring to Rosen (1977), is 
that individuals with a constant marginal internal rate of return and a fix interest rate will 
be indifferent to the level of schooling when Rbi = , choose zero schooling when 
or choose an endless quantity of schooling when . This problem, comments 
Oreopoulos (2004), can be solved once a curvature is added in the marginal costs or the 
marginal benefits of schooling. Hence, he introduces the following earnings function: 
Rbi < Rbi >
2
12
1
)(
SkSbiieSy
−+= α  
which allows the marginal benefits to be heterogeneous and to decrease with additional 
schooling. Then, using the first order conditions again, he arrives to: 
RSkb
Sy
Sy
i =−= 1)(
)('  
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where  is a random variable, with mean and variance , and  is a non-negative 
constant. Subsequently, he shows an optimal schooling solution that allows for different 
levels of optimal schooling: 
ib
−
b 2bσ 1k
1k
RbS i −=  
Furthermore Oreopoulos (2004) allows heterogeneity of  to affect the optimal 
schooling to show the two possible sources of ability bias with a functional form like: 
ia
i
SkSb
AeSy i += −
2
12
1
)(  
that together with the first order conditions gives us: 
R
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i
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2
1
2
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In this case he shows the optimal choice of schooling is affected by presence of 
heterogeneity in the initial earnings level, thus making schooling attainment lower when 
these initial earnings levels are higher. Hence, from this result he observes the existence 
of two kind of ability bias. On the one hand, there is a bias due to differences in 
endowments of ability, i.e. differences in the levels of ability of each person, which has a 
propensity to lower the amount of optimal schooling. On the other hand, there is a bias 
due to differences in the interactions between ability and schooling i.e. differences in the 
slopes, which is the one that Oreopoulos (2004) continues to elucidate following Card 
(2000) analysis since this source of bias is the one that “supply side” empirical literature 
worries more about. 
 In the presence of heterogeneity of costs, where  can be considered as an 
alternative to measure liquidity constraints and a lifecycle function where utility out of 
school is , and utility whilst in school is 
iR
))(( tcu )())(( ttcu φ− in which )(tφ is a convex 
function that reflects a dislike of school, Oreopoulos (2004) formulates the lifecycle 
utility from Card (2000):   
∫∫ ∞ −− −+−= S tS t dtettcudtettcutcSV ρρ φφ ))())((())())((())(,( 0  
 Letting be he shows that the first order conditions yield: )(log))(( tctcu =
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i ≡+= − φρ ρ       [1] 
which is a simplified version of Card’s model.  
So, when inspecting this equation Card (2000) exhibits the two possible sources 
of heterogeneity affecting schooling choice and that he specifies in a simple way as: 
 
Skb
Sy
Sy
i 1)(
)(' −=         [2] 
SkrSd i 2)( +=         [3] 
where and  are random variables and and are non-negative constants. Beginning 
with the first expression [2], Card (2000) observes heterogeneity from the benefits of 
schooling that is represented by different marginal returns to schooling. As of the second 
expression [3], Card (2000) observes that heterogeneity arises from differences in the 
marginal costs of schooling. Thus, from these two expressions the optimal schooling 
choice is: 
ib ir 1k 2k
krbS iii /)( −=         [4] 
with . In this expression Card (2000) shows optimal schooling like a linear 
function of the heterogeneity terms of each individual. With this equilibrium in schooling 
choice, he points out that the marginal return to schooling is: 
21 kkk +=
kkrkkbSkb iiiii /)/1( 111 +−=−≡β  
 Concerning this framework, which allows heterogeneity in the costs and benefits, it is 
possible to see two particular cases for the distribution of returns to education. In the first 
case, Card (2000) supposes 02 =k  and  for all individuals, which permits to see 
that individuals have equality of opportunities and differences in the return to schooling 
arise due to heterogeneity in abilities. The second case occur when Card (2000) allows 
 and , a situation where all individuals have equality of abilities and 
differences in the return to schooling arise due to heterogeneity in the marginal costs. 
Taking expectations  is the average marginal return 
from one more year of education for a random sample of population. Although this 
_
rri =
01 =k
_
bbi =
_
1
_
1
_
)()( SkbSkbEE iii −=−== ββ
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average return might not be completely relevant for specific sub-populations, Card uses it 
as a point of reference to compare the coefficients of different estimation methods.  
Taking this model as a basis, Card (2000) deducts an empirical form, where for 
simplicity he excludes experience in order to see the implications in the estimation of . 
Thus the equation he begins with is: 
_β
2
12
1)(log iiii SkSbSy −+= α  
Card (2000) remarks that in this equation the individual heterogeneity can affect the 
intercept and the slope and re-writes it as 
iiiii SbbaSkSbaSy )(2
1)(log
_
2
1
_
0 −++−+=     [5] 
where 0aa ii −≡ α has mean 0. In this case Card says, equations [4] and [5] depict a two 
equation system in terms of   iii randba ,
where  and  are the linear projections of  
 on observed schooling. When he substitutes these projections in [5] he 
arrives to: 
iii uSSa +−= )(
_
0λ iii vSSbb +−=− )(
_
0
_ ψ
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_
bbanda ii −
iiiii SvuSkSSbconstSy ++−++++= 210
_
00
_
)2
1()()(log ψψλ  
Further Card (2000) mentions that if the third central moments of a joint distribution for 
and are zero there will not be a correlation between  and . In this case he 
explains that   and the projection of on  has a slope . Then, 
when calculating the probability limit of the ordinary least squares regression regarding 
the coefficient for returns to education, he arrives to: 
ib ir ii Sv iS
0)( 3
_ =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ − SSE i 2iS iS
_
2 S
)2/1(2lim 10
__
00
_
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In this equation Card (2000) presents the ability bias problem that arises between 
schooling and earnings, where 0λ is the traditional ability bias and 0ψ is the comparative 
advantage bias. Card (2000) points out that in the case all individuals had the same 
marginal benefits from schooling the bias would be . Thus, 0
_
lim λ=− bbp ols 0λ  is 
equivalent to the omitted variable bias that arises from the correlation between the ability 
 and the marginal cost of schooling  and would be positive if  which 
means marginal costs are lower for persons that would earn more at any level of 
education. In the case that individuals have different marginal benefits together with 
different intercepts, Card (2000) asserts a more complicated problem because individuals 
with higher returns to education have incentives to have higher levels of education. 
Therefore, this endogen source of bias, according to him, will give a biased estimator 
even if there is no variation in the intercepts. This endogeneity bias is 
ia ir 0),cov( <ii ra
S0ψ , where  
fkSSb iii ∗== )var(/),cov(0ψ .Here  is the fraction of the variance of schooling that 
we can attribute to the differences in the slope of the earnings-schooling relation and it 
can be expressed as: 
f
),cov(2)var()var(
),cov()var(
iiii
iii
rbrb
rbbf −+
−= . 
Moreover, if it is assumed that marginal benefits are no higher for persons that face 
higher marginal costs, i.e. 0),cov( <ii rb , the ordinary least squares estimator will be 
upward biased. Additionally, if there is an additive measurement error in the schooling 
variable of the form , where  is observed schooling,  is true schooling 
and
ii
o
i SS ε+= oiS iS
iε  has 0)( =iE ε  and variance , Card (2000) shows that the probability limit of 
ordinary least squares estimator will be: 
2
εσ
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++= _00
_
0)lim( SRbp ols ψλβ  
where [ ] 1)var(/)var()var(/),cov( 2000 <+== εσiiiii SSSSSR when ii S⊥ε . In this case the 
ordinary least squares estimator will be downward biased. 
Further on Card (2000) analyses different instrumental variables (IV) estimators 
within this framework and concludes that IV estimators yield higher estimates than OLS 
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due to three important reasons. Firstly, he says that if assuming ability biases are small in 
the OLS estimates of the return to schooling, then the differences between IV and OLS 
will reflect the downward bias of OLS caused by measurements errors. Secondly, he 
states that IV estimates could be even more upward biased that OLS due to unobserved 
differences between the characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups. Thirdly,     
Card (2000) says that since researchers tend to favor estimates with higher t-statistics, 
this could produce a specification search bias. Fourthly, Card (2000) comments that 
under heterogeneity IV estimates that take into account changes in the supply side 
recuperate the returns to schooling of individuals with high returns to schooling. Finally, 
he argues that even with ideal instruments the results of IV estimators are weighted 
averages of the returns to education for the sub-population whose schooling decision was 
affected by the instrument and that OLS estimates, even if upward biased, are a 
somewhat conservative estimate of the causal effects for groups affected by supply side 
changes.  
To summarize, the fact that the Mincer earnings function does not take into 
account all these possible sources of bias mentioned above through a complete supply 
and demand framework suggests, according to Pons (2004), an incompatibility with the 
optimizing behavior of individuals. In that sense Card (2000) concludes that using a 
supply and demand framework is more interesting since it results in more complete 
econometric models. However, both Pons (2004) and Card (2000) say that estimates from 
OLS and IV are interesting tools for estimating returns to education once we take into 
account the possible bias and are careful to interpret the results. 
 
3.2. Job market signaling: Introduction to sheepskin effects 
 
Pons (2004) explains that signaling hypothesis embraces several theories that consider 
education has more purposes than increasing productivity. On the one hand, Pons (2004) 
tells that signaling hypothesis leads to models of signaling, filter and selection which 
keep economic rationality and which on average anticipate that individuals with higher 
education levels are more productive and consequently receive higher earnings. She says 
that these theories consider the employers use education attainment, particularly the 
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diplomas, to obtain information and choose the most potentially productive workers. She 
remarks the models of Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1975) about signaling, Arrow‘s (1973) 
models about filters mechanisms in function of the individuals’ abilities and Rotschild 
and Stiglitz’ (1976) selection models with educative requirement of the firms for the 
development of this hypothesis. In general, Pons (2004) explains that these models 
assume there is asymmetric information where workers usually have information about 
their level of productivity whereas the firms do not. In this context, individuals with 
different levels of productivity are self-selected to different levels of education and 
different solutions are conceived using education as a source of information. On the other 
hand, she exposes that there is a credentials approach studied by Berg (1970) and Dore 
(1976) where education serves as a way to access certain jobs in such a way that 
employers offer better wages and positions to persons with higher diplomas whether they 
are more productive or not. The possible reasons behind this, according to her, are 
snobbism, misperception about the value of education and entry barriers. Nevertheless, 
Pons clarifies that this approach in its extreme form does not work since it does not 
explain why employers would want to pay higher wages due to the possession of a 
diploma relative to the productivity of an employee. What is more, she argues that if 
certain employers acted in this pure form in a competitive market with other employers 
that did not proceed like this, the employers acting in a pure credentialist way would be 
in disadvantage. On the other hand, she says the theory behind signalization puts 
emphasis on the value of the information education gives about productivity than in the 
end will produce different earnings streams for individuals with different levels of 
productivity. Nevertheless, as she mentions, presently the signaling hypothesis is not in 
opposition to the human capital theory since the first considers that education serves to 
raise productivity and to inform about innate abilities. Conversely, the empirical 
implications of the signaling hypothesis makes it very attractive since it gets through the 
omitted ability problem in the earnings function because firms use education as a signal 
to get information about abilities. Furthermore, she argues that from this approach since 
firms have difficulty to observe ability and use education as a signal, the coefficient of an 
ability variable should not be unavoidably significant.  
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Finally and as a conclusion of this section, Ferrer and Riddell (2001) state that since the 
nature of returns to human capital is more complex than the implications of both theories, 
these two should be reliable to some extent. However, a problem arises when trying to 
use both theories for the study of human capital since the data for carrying out these 
studies usually shows only one of the two measures. Therefore, they presume that another 
possible source of bias in the returns to education might arise from the omission of 
credentials’ effects. Furthermore, they judge it reasonable to assume that the importance 
of schooling years and credentials differ by level of schooling attainment, diploma and 
country. Thus, they conclude evaluating both measures is important for Canadian 
immigration policy since knowing the sheepskin effects might contribute to enhance 
admission criteria and facilitate integration of foreign human capital. 
 
4. ESTIMATION APPROACH 
 
For our econometric analysis we use a variation of the standard log-wage equation 
developed by Mincer (1974). Particularly, we will base our estimations on the equation 
Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) develop, making some changes for taking into account the 
sheepskin effects approach of Ferrer and Riddell (2004). Thus, like Aydemir and 
Skuterud (2005) we divide experience and schooling in their Canadian and foreign 
components. Moreover, to take into account the sheepskin effects we add a series of 
dummy variables with the highest earned degree achieved by the person3.  Hence, the 
first equation is similar to the one used by Aydemir and Skuterud with the exclusion of 
interactions between cohorts and Canadian years of experience: 
 
                                                 
3These dummies reflect the census variable of highest earned diploma and  are written in a non-cumulative 
way:  
α1 =1 if no diploma    
α1=0 otherwise 
α4=1 if collegial diploma 
α4=0 otherwise 
α7=1 if masters diploma 
α7=0 otherwise 
α2=1 if secondary diploma 
α2=0 otherwise 
α5=1 if university certificate 
α5=0 otherwise 
α8=1 if PhD diploma 
α8=0 otherwise 
α3=1 if school of trades certificate 
α3=0 otherwise 
α6=1 if bachelor diploma 
α6=0 otherwise 
 
The dummy of bachelor diploma includes persons with bachelor diploma, MD diploma and superior to 
bachelor diploma. 
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The second equation adds the interactions between immigration cohorts and Canadian 
years of experience: 
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The third equation adds common sheepskin effects: 
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Finally, the fourth equation allows for different sheepskin effects:  
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In all equations, potential years of experience are divided in two variables that show 
Canadian years of experience (EXPc) and foreign years experience (EXPf) where EXP = 
EXPc + EXPf.  Furthermore, all equations include an interaction of foreign and Canadian 
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years of experience (EXPc*EXPf) and the square of Canadian and foreign years of 
experience (EXPc2 and EXPf2 respectively) to reflect the decreasing pattern of these 
variables. In the case of schooling years we divide similarly to obtain Canadian schooling 
years (Sc) and foreign schooling years (Sf) where S = Sc + Sf.4  In addition to the 
schooling years, equations [3] and [4] include a series of dummies representing the 
highest degree of the individual. This was made to test for sheepskin effects. The variable 
I is a dummy that takes value one for the immigrants and zero otherwise. The series of 
cohort dummies Cj reflect the earning differences among immigrants that entered at 
different periods of time. Other control dummies we use exclusively for immigrants refer 
to the region of birth. We also use supplementary common control dummies in all 
specifications for both, Canadians and immigrants that indicate knowledge of official 
languages, province of residence, married status and living in a metropolitan area.  
Contrasting to Aydemir and Skuterud (2005), we use different macroeconomic 
labor market related variables to control for period effects. We decided to do this with the 
aim of testing the robustness of the results once we control with different variables that 
reflect information regarding the business cycle. Thus, after estimating the four equations 
with unemployment rate, which is interacted with immigrant dummy, we re-estimated 
equation [4] using unemployment rate, employment rate and labor activity rate5. The 
unemployment rate, defined as the percentage of the labor force that actively seeks for a 
                                                 
4 Since we only have access to the Public User Micro Data File we have to derive some variables. Firstly, 
we calculate “years since migration” using the immigration year variable and the year when census was 
performed. In the cases where data is grouped, we used the mean of the group. Once this is done we derive 
“age at immigration” simply subtracting “years since migration” from the current age. Secondly, we 
estimate the total schooling years using the methodology suggested by Li (1997) that is explained in the 
next section. Thirdly, we calculate total potential years of experience using the Mincer (1974) age-S-6 
formula. Once these variables are obtained and assuming all immigrants achieved their schooling in a 
continuous period of time and entered the labor market right after school we are able to observe the “age of 
entry to the labor market” for each immigrant after adding six years to “total schooling years”. Then we 
compare the “age of entry to the labor market” with the “age at immigration”. Only if                                 
“age of entry to the labor market”>“age at immigration” we observe some Canadian schooling that we can 
calculate subtracting these variables. In the case of equality we do not observe Canadian schooling nor 
foreign experience and if “age of entry to the labor market”<“age at immigration” we do not observe 
Canadian schooling but foreign experience. We are aware of the problems that could arise from the 
continuous schooling assumption and measurement errors in education and experience. However, looking 
at the results of Card and Lemieux (2000) regarding school-leaving behavior where they find that just one 
quarter of those who leave school return in the future and from those, more than half just complete one 
semester or even less, we find very plausible this assumption.          
5 We estimated these rates using the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) census classification for the years 
1990, 1995 and 2000. For the persons living in rural areas we estimated the same rates within each 
province for the same years. 
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job but has not been able to find it, lets us know the difficulty individuals in the labor 
force have to find a job. Nonetheless, it is useful to remember that the unemployment rate 
does not take into account discouraged job seekers that leave the labor force when they 
perceive it is too difficult to find a job. For example, a relatively small unemployment 
rate might be hiding the fact that there are discouraged work seekers leaving the labor 
market, thus making the rate small. For this reason we also use the employment rate, 
which represents the percentage of working-age-people that has job, and the labor force 
activity rate, which is the percentage of working-age-people who work or are actively 
looking for one. In addition and with the purpose of staying away from the problem that 
Moulton (1990) reports from using macro data in micro data analysis, we use cluster-
robust errors by province for all our estimations. A development of this robust cluster 
variance estimator is given by Williams (2000), which “[...] presents a general proof that 
the modified-sandwich estimator is unbiased for cluster-correlated data regardless of the 
setting [...]” (Williams, 2000, p.645).  
 
5. DATA 
 
In line of the current literature we use pooled data from the public use micro data files 
(PUMF) of three different Canadian censuses -1991, 1996 and 2001- to build our sample. 
The 1991 and 1996 PUMF contain both data based on a 2.8 percent sample of the 
population listed in the census. The 2001 PUMF contains data based on a 2.7 percent 
sample of the population listed in the census. Following Ferrer and Riddell (2004) our 
sample is restricted to fulltime male wage earners that reported working periods of 52 
weeks per year and working hours of at least 30 hours per week. It is also limited to 
persons between 20 and 65 years old6 living in Quebec, Ontario and the western 
provinces since we did not find enough immigrants for Atlantic Provinces. Our 
dependent variable is the log of weekly wages and salaries at constant prices (using the 
Consumer Price Index, CPI) of 2000. Like in other studies, the use of fulltime male 
workers in connection with weekly wages is a simple way to leave out labor supply 
                                                 
6 We consider that schooling/labor decisions for persons under 20 might vary their labor market 
participation across censuses as well as retirement decisions might affect persons over 65 years old. 
 24
issues. Furthermore, we consider that females deserve their own study. So, our sample 
contains 244 047 individuals, from which 80.05 percent are native born Canadians and 
19.95 percent are permanent resident immigrants. Table 1 shows the mean values of the 
variables for each group. In order to have consistent variables across censuses for the 
region of origin indicators we put them into 6 groups7. In order to calculate schooling 
years we used the methodology suggested by Li (1997). On the one hand, we recode 
some variables presented in intervals. On the other hand, we construct the variable from 
others available in the censuses. Individuals reporting less than grade 5 are coded as 
having 2.5 years of schooling. Individuals reporting between grade 5 and 8 are coded as 
having 6.5 years of schooling. Furthermore, schooling years for persons that reported 
secondary are equal to the highest grade achieved, with grade 13 recoded as year 12. 
Finally, schooling years for those with post-secondary education result from the sum of 
12 years (of elementary and secondary schooling years) and years spent in university or 
non-university education, whichever is larger in number of years. A nuisance of our 
research arises from the data format of the census public files used in this study. Some 
variables are top coded while others are presented in intervals. In order to divide 
schooling years and experience in its Canadian and foreign components, like Ferrer and 
Riddell (2004), who face the same difficulty, we derive some variables such as 
immigration year, immigration age, entry year to labor market and age of entry to the 
labor market. In the case of year of immigration, we recoded it for the observations that 
were presented in intervals. The variable of age at immigration was almost completely 
derived from immigration year, present age and census year. These variables together 
with the schooling years helped us to approximate years since migration, labor force 
entry age and finally break up schooling years and experience years in its Canadian and 
foreign components8. In the remaining part of this section we make an effort to describe 
some general patterns among native-born male Canadians and male immigrants in an 
interesting but simple manner.  
                                                 
7 Since data from the 1991 census used a different classification of countries than the other two and 
grouped some western and eastern European countries together we decided to put them into one group with 
exception of the England, which along with the United States of America are consistently measured. Thus, 
we use these two countries as reference region of origin. We sub-divided Asia in three groups but in 
preliminary analysis we found the coefficients were not statistically different, thus we decided to see Asia 
as a single group. 
8 vid.supra footnote 4 
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In Table 2 we can observe the male schooling attainment composition by census 
year and immigrant status. This table shows that within the groups a larger percentage of 
immigrants have university and post-university education in comparison to native-born 
Canadians for the three censuses. Moreover, the cumulative percentage of individuals 
with university and post-university education is increasing for both native-born 
Canadians and immigrants in the sample. Additionally, it is also interesting to revise the 
percentages of native-born Canadians and immigrants with college education. We notice 
that among native-born Canadians the percentage with college education increase for 
each census while for immigrants there is a decrease between the 1991 and 1996 censuses 
and a small increase between the 1996 and 2001 censuses. In contrast, for the secondary, 
primary and no schooling classifications we can see a continuous decrease throughout the 
three censuses for both groups.  
Regarding credentials, Table 3 shows the male distribution of highest obtained 
diplomas of native-born Canadians and immigrants in the sample. The table allows us to 
revise the composition of the credentials that the two groups have. This is important for 
our analysis since we believe that the credentials of individuals have a different effect 
than the schooling years, thus being rewarded differently than the latter. In general, Table 
3 also shows that between the two groups, immigrants have a larger percentage of 
individuals holding higher diplomas than native-born Canadians. For instance, while for 
the 1991 Census 17.38 percent of immigrants and the 11.76 percent of native-born have a 
Bachelor, Master or PhD degree, for the 2001 Census 23.70 percent of immigrants and 
13.79 percent of native-born Canadians have a Bachelor, Master or PhD degree.  
 Language distribution knowledge by male native-born Canadians and male 
immigrants is presented in Table 4. This shows a small increasing trend among native-
born Canadians in the knowledge of English or both (English and French), and a decrease 
in merely the knowledge of French. Interestingly, there is an increase in the percentage of 
immigrants knowing neither French nor English from the 1991 to the 1996 census. In 
contrast, when comparing the 1996 and 2001 censuses, we can see a very small increase 
in the knowledge of English and both (English and French) and a decrease for only 
French. The importance of this variable relies in the fact that the familiarity with at least 
one official language can facilitate the integration of immigrants since it can help them to 
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continue studying, obtain a job, acquire local experience, specific values, and develop 
other abilities that are valued in the Canadian labor market.  
Table 5 shows the birth region composition among male immigrants for the three 
censuses. We can see that the proportion of immigrants coming from United States, 
England and European countries is decreasing, while the proportion of immigrants from 
Asia and Africa is increasing. In the case of male immigrants from Latin America, we 
can see that while their proportion increases between the 1991 and 1996 censuses, it 
shows a small decrease between the 1996 and 2001 censuses. Several studies of 
immigrants’ returns to education argue that changes in the composition of source 
countries might explain the decrease of wages immigrants perceive. This decrease would 
be caused by the difficulties to transfer human capital from source countries that have 
very different societies and practices. In order to illustrate how these characteristics 
presented above interact with wages, we introduce another set of tables that describe the 
distribution of weekly wages.  
Table 6 shows the average weekly wage by immigration status and schooling 
attainment for each census year for our sample. We observe that for the 1991 census, the 
average weekly wages for fulltime-working male immigrants seem similar or larger at all 
schooling levels than for native-born Canadians with the exception of secondary and 
college education. Conversely, for the subsequent censuses this seems to be reversed for 
all levels of education with exception to primary education for the 2001 Census.  
Table 7 breaks down average weekly wages by immigrant status and highest 
obtained diplomas for each census. We see that in almost all categories, native-born 
Canadians seem to receive a higher average weekly wage than immigrants for the three 
censuses. The only categories in which immigrants seem to have a higher mean wage are 
school of trade’s diploma collegial diploma and PhD diploma for the 1991 Census and 
school trades diploma for the 2001 Census. 
 Finally, table 8 shows the average weekly wages by region of origin and Census 
for our sample. We can see in this table that there are some differences in the wages of 
immigrants from different regions. Immigrants coming from the United States and 
England seem to earn more than native-born Canadians and immigrants from other 
regions. Moreover, immigrants from Europe and Africa seem to have similar 
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remuneration than Canadians. However, immigrants coming from Asia and Latin-
America on average seem to earn lower weekly wages than native-born Canadians and 
the other groups. We must recall that Table 6, which describes the proportion of 
immigrants from different regions for each census, shows a noteworthy increase of 
immigration form Asia and Latin-America. Thus, it looks like that the variable “region of 
origin” is a key factor to explain the decrease in wages for immigrants. The next section 
discusses these issues in more detail using results from econometric estimations.   
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
In this section we present the results from our estimations. We begin analyzing the results 
from estimating specifications [1], [2], [3] and [4] from Section 4 using unemployment 
rate interacted with immigrant dummy to control for period effects. The complete 
estimates from these regressions are shown in Table 9. However, for expositional 
purposes, we present some selected estimates in tables throughout the explanation and 
only occasionally ask the reader to see Table 9. Further, we examine some results from 
estimating specification [4] with different variables to control for period effects, 
specifically employment rate and activity rate. The complete results of these estimations 
are in Table 10 but we introduce some selected coefficients during the section to facilitate 
explanations and only occasionally ask the reader to see Table 10.  
 
6.1. Results of specifications 1 to 4 using unemployment rate   
6.1.1. Returns to experience  
From Table 11 we can observe that the return to Canadian years of working experience 
for native-born Canadians is quite similar across the different specifications. Conversely, 
in the case of immigrants although showing negative coefficients for all specifications, 
only for specification [1] the coefficient is statistically significant at 10 percent level of 
confidence. However, when verifying immigrants’ returns to Canadian experience for 
different cohorts relative to the immigrants arriving before 1970 in specifications [2] to 
[4], we remark that in general immigrants’ returns to Canadian experience for later 
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cohorts are inferior to those from immigrants arriving before 1970. In the case of the 
1970-1974 cohort we see an important reduction in the returns to Canadian experience 
followed by small improvement for the next cohort and again reductions for the 1980-
1984 and 1985-1989 cohorts9. Only for the two most recent cohorts the coefficients are 
positive though not statistically significant. When comparing our results with those from 
Aydemir and Skuterud (2005), despite the differences in the coefficient values estimates, 
we coincide that there is a recovery of the last two arrival cohorts. Nevertheless, we also 
report a small recovery for the 1975-1979 cohort that Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) 
results do not capture.     
With regards to evolution of returns to Canadian years of experience, for 
specifications [1] and [2], we see that for native-born Canadians the variation on wages 
with increases in years of Canadian experience goes from 4.17 percent with one year of 
Canadian experience to 3.02 percent with ten years of Canadian experience. In contrast, 
immigrants’ variation on wages with increases in years of Canadian experience in 
specification [1] goes from 3.34 percent with one year of Canadian experience to 2.30 
percent with ten years of Canadian experience respectively. Furthermore, for 
specifications [3] and [4], that control for common sheepskin effects and different 
sheepskin effects respectively, native-born variation on wages with increases in years of 
Canadian experience goes from 4.27 with one year of Canadian experience to 3.04 with 
ten years of Canadian experience. In the case of immigrants we can observe in Table 12 
the different numbers for each cohort for specifications [2], [3] and [4] that allow for 
different assimilation patterns. In general for all the specification and cohorts, the 
immigrants’ variation on wages with increases in years of Canadian experience is inferior 
with the exception of the most recent cohort.   
                                                 
9 After performing a Wald test on specification [2], [3] and [4] we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality for the following  premise:  
Test canadian_exp* c1975_1979*imm= canadian_exp* c1980_1984*imm   
(2) F(1,5) = 0.19  Prob > F = 0.6818 
(3) F(1,5) = 0.05  Prob > F = 0.8358 
(4) F(1,5) = 0.02  Prob > F = 0.8959 
Conversely, we reject the null hypothesis  of another series of Wald tests on specifications [2],[3] and [4] to 
test for equality of the following premise:   
test canadian_exp* c1970_1974*imm= canadian_exp* c1975_1979*imm= canadian_exp* c1980_1984*imm   
(2) F(2,5) = 17.95 Prob > F = 0.0052 
(3) F(2,5) = 21.54 Prob > F = 0.0035 
(4) F(2,5) = 18.36 Prob > F = 0.0050 
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Table 11 
Returns to Canadian and Foreign Experience 
  Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
Canadian experience 0.0431 0.0431 0.0441 0.0441 
  (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)***
Canadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0082 -0.0038 -0.0050 -0.0050 
  (0.0033)* (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
Canadian experienceX1970-1974Ximmigrant   -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0051 
    (0.0006)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)***
Canadian experienceX1975-1979Ximmigrant   -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 
    (0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)***
Canadian experienceX1980-1984Ximmigrant   -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0023 
    (0.0010)** (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Canadian experienceX1985-1989Ximmigrant   -0.0075 -0.0067 -0.0065 
    (0.0012)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0017)** 
Canadian experienceX1990-1994Ximmigrant   0.0056 0.0075 0.0081 
    (0.0037) (0.0037)* (0.0038)* 
Canadian experienceX1995-2000Ximmigrant   0.0007 0.0039 0.0051 
    (0.0096) (0.0090) (0.0089) 
Canadian experience2 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
Canadian experience2Ximmigrant 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.00001) 
ForeignXCanadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
Foreign experienceXimmigrant 0.0111 0.0111 0.0120 0.0121 
  (0.0009)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0007)***
Foreign experience2Ximmigrant -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0001)*** (0.00001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
When looking to the foreign experience coefficients in Table 11, we observe these 
being statistically significant in all specifications. Moreover, we can notice the returns to 
foreign experience are in all cases unsurprisingly small; indicating the transferability of 
foreign experience is low. The evidence collected by Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) 
and Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) together with our evidence points out that returns to 
foreign experience are tiny. When comparing the returns to Canadian experience with the 
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returns to foreign experience we can see that the latter correspond to a little fragment in 
the region of 25.00 percent of the returns to Canadian experience.10      
 
Table 12 
Evolution of Immigrants Returns to Canadian experience (%) 
  
  
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification 
4 
Cohort 1970-1974       
 Canadian experience =1yr 3.2707 3.2348 3.2225
 Canadian experience =10yrs 2.1088 2.0639 2.0457
Cohort 1975-1979       
 Canadian experience =1yr 3.5678 3.5440 3.5245
 Canadian experience =10yrs 2.4059 2.3731 2.3476
Cohort 1980-1984       
 Canadian experience =1yr 3.5106 3.5100 3.5018
 Canadian experience =10yrs 2.3487 2.3391 2.3250
Cohort 1985-1989       
 Canadian experience =1yr 3.0162 3.0737 3.0782
 Canadian experience =10yrs 1.8543 1.9028 1.9014
Cohort 1990-1994       
 Canadian experience =1yr 4.3293 4.4944 4.5383
 Canadian experience =10yrs 3.1674 3.3235 3.3614
Cohort 1995-2000       
 Canadian experience =1yr 3.8359 4.1262 4.2404
 Canadian experience =10yrs 2.6740 2.9553 3.0635
(foreign experience=1yr)    
   
The fact that immigrants’ return to foreign experience is just a very small fraction 
of the returns to Canadian experience shows that Canadian labor market gives a low 
value to this human capital immigrants bring with them. This is seen more clearly in 
Table 13, revising the evolution of immigrants’ returns to foreign working experience in 
presence of different amounts of Canadian years of experience. For example, when 
looking the left column for specification [1], Table 13 shows the variation on wage with 
increase in years of foreign experience going from 1.03 with one year to 0.57 with ten 
                                                 
10  We reject the null hypothesis of a Wald test in all specifications for the following test:  
test  canadian_exp+canadian_exp*imm1=foreign_exp 
(1) F(1,5) = 89.83 Prob> F = 0.0002 
(2) F(1,5) = 165.89 Prob> F = 0.0001 
(3) F(1,5) = 127.98 Prob> F = 0.0001 
(4) F(1,5) = 113.49 Prob> F = 0.0001  
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years of foreign experience. Nevertheless, when looking the right column for the same 
specification (when immigrants have ten years of Canadian experience instead of one) the 
variation on wage with increase in years of foreign experience shrinks, starting now from 
0.74 with one year of  foreign experience and ending in 0.28 with ten years respectively. 
With reference to specifications [2], [3] and [4], we can see in Table 13 that the numbers 
undergo very small changes. However, despite these changes, results show foreign 
experience has a lower impact on wages for immigrants than Canadian experience and 
with increasing years of Canadian experience, the contribution of foreign experience is 
even poorer.  
Table 13  
Evolution of Immigrants Returns to Foreign experience (%) 
  
  
 Canadian 
experience =1yr 
 Canadian 
experience =10yrs
eq.1     
Foreign experience=1yr 1.0300 0.7428
Foreign experience=10yrs 0.5728 0.2856
eq.2     
Foreign experience=1yr 1.0249 0.7443
Foreign experience=10yrs 0.5666 0.2860
eq.3     
Foreign experience=1yr 1.0959 0.6877
Foreign experience=10yrs 0.5876 0.1794
eq.4     
Foreign experience=1yr 1.1036 0.6512
Foreign experience=10yrs 0.5807 0.1283
 
6.1.2. Birth region effects and knowledge of official languages effects 
In Table 14 we observe the effects of region of birth. Overall, we see that the effects 
throughout all specifications are negative, quite similar and statistically significant. We 
also observe that as we pass from specification [1] to specification [4], which has 
sheepskin controls, the negative effects vaguely increase for Europe, Asia and Africa and 
dimly decrease for Latin America and other regions. On the whole, coming from regions 
different to the United States and England has negative effects on wages. Nevertheless, if 
we revise the effects of each region, we detect that there are important differences among 
them. For example, equation 4 shows that coming from Europe decreases the wage 10.07 
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percent compared to immigrants from United States and England, whereas coming from 
Asia decreases it about 26.93 percent compared to immigrants from United States and 
England. Similarly, in the same equation, coming from Latin America negatively affects 
the wage up to 23.77 percent while coming from Africa decreases the wage by 19.82 
percent11. The magnitude, sign and significance of these coefficients support the idea that 
declines in immigrants’ wages are related to the shifts in region of birth.  
Table 14  
Birth region effects for different specifications 
  Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
Europe -0.0934 -0.0939 -0.0976 -0.1007 
  (0.0148)*** (0.0144)*** (0.0175)*** (0.0175)*** 
Asia -0.2507 -0.2509 -0.2665 -0.2693 
  (0.0063)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0092)*** (0.0110)*** 
Africa -0.1847 -0.1850 -0.1955 -0.1982 
  (0.0203)*** (0.0200)*** (0.0233)*** (0.0245)*** 
Latin_America -0.2543 -0.2537 -0.2419 -0.2377 
  (0.0257)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0235)*** (0.0229)*** 
Others -0.0550 -0.0535 -0.0457 -0.0417 
  (0.0456) (0.0457) (0.0388) (0.0366) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Region of Reference: United States and England   
 
The evidence presented here concerning wage decrease for immigrants from non-
traditional regions supports the results of Bloom, Gernier and Gunderson (1995) Green 
and Worswick (2003, 2004), Ferrer and Riddell (2004),  Sweetman (2004) and Aydemir 
and Skuterud (2005) which conclude that an important part of the decrease in immigrants 
wages is due to the changes in the composition of source countries. 
Turning to the effects of knowledge of French, both English and French and, 
neither English or French relative to the knowledge of English, we can see in Table 9 that 
all coefficients are statistically significant and show the importance of knowing English 
or both (English and French) relative to knowing only French or neither official language. 
                                                 
11 After testing for the null hypothesis for equal region of origin coefficients among immigrants from Asia 
and Latin America, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for all equations. The test and results are: 
Test Asia – Latin America = 0  
(1) F(1,5) =  0.03  Prob > F =  0.8722 
(2) F(1,5) =  1.02  Prob > F =  0.9020 
(3) F(1,5) =  1.93  Prob > F =  0.2230 
(4) F(1,5) =  3.86  Prob > F =  0.1067 
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Moreover, we can see that in the case of only knowing French, the coefficients for the 
first two specifications have a less negative impact than for the last two that control for 
sheepskin effects. Conversely, when looking the effects of knowing both languages 
relative to knowing only English, we can see that the positive effect diminishes when 
controlling for sheepskin effects in the last two specifications. Finally, for immigrants, 
the lack of knowledge of both official languages has further negative effects for 
specifications [3] and [4] than for specifications [1] and [2].  
6.1.3. Sheepskin effects and Returns to schooling 
Regarding sheepskin effects and return to Canadian and foreign schooling years for 
specifications [3] and [4], we can see in Table 15 that in most cases all coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant. Specification [3] shows that no matter the degree, 
there is an increase in the wage relative to the persons not having any degree whatsoever. 
This specification, which considers common sheepskin effects, shows a solid increase of 
the effect the higher the degree. For instance, having a Secondary diploma increases 
wage by 6.74 percent compared to not having any diploma whereas having a School of 
Trades diploma increases wage by 11.83 percent and having a College diploma increases 
it by 17.23 percent. In the case of University Certificate diploma, wage is increased by 
19.49 percent whilst a Bachelor diploma gives a big leap of a 32.89 percent compared to 
someone without any diploma. Regarding graduate diplomas, having a Master diploma 
increases wages by 37.03 percent while having a PhD diploma increases wage by 44.12 
percent compared to someone without any diplomas12. However, when checking the 
same results for specification [4], which allows for different sheepskin effects for native-
born and immigrants, we see some differences between the groups. On the one hand, the 
coefficients interacting with immigrant dummy for Secondary diploma and University 
Certificate are not statistically significant, thus having a similar return relative to 
Canadians with equivalent diplomas. On the other hand, the coefficients for School of 
Trades and University diplomas are positive and statistically significant. Therefore, 
indicating that while for lower diplomas the sheepskin effects are not statistically 
                                                 
12When testing for equality of coefficients for specification [3] we reject the following null hypothesis: 
Master degree = PhD degree  
(3) F(1, 5) = 28.78  Prob > F= 0.0030 
 34
different, for higher diplomas there are some differences in the returns for immigrants 
and native-born Canadians. 
Table 15 
sheepskin effects  
  Eq.3 Eq.4 
Secondary diploma 0.0674 0.0686 
  (0.0045)*** (0.0040)***
School of trades diploma 0.1183 0.1108 
  (0.0098)*** (0.0104)***
Collegial diploma 0.1723 0.1588 
  (0.0187)*** (0.0246)***
University certificate 0.1949 0.1892 
  (0.0283)*** (0.0294)***
Bachelor diploma 0.3289 0.3041 
  (0.0226)*** (0.0251)***
Master diploma  0.3703 0.3295 
  (0.0274)*** (0.0319)***
PhD diploma 0.4412 0.3334 
  (0.0258)*** (0.0478)***
Secondary diplomaXimmigrant   -0.0190 
    (0.0200) 
School of trades diplomaXimmigrant   0.0360 
    (0.0127)**
Collegial diplomaXimmigrant   0.0558 
    (0.0255)* 
University certificateXimmigrant   0.0267 
    (0.0240) 
Bachelor diplomaXimmigrant   0.0987 
    (0.0228)***
Master diplomaXimmigrant   0.14513 
    (0.0230)***
PhD diplomaXimmigrant   0.2616 
    (0.0396)***
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Moreover, for native-born Canadians we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients for having a Master diploma and a PhD diploma whereas for immigrants we 
do reject the null hypothesis of equal sheepskin effects of these two diplomas. So, 
according to these results, there are higher sheepskin effects for immigrants the higher the 
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diploma.13 For instance, holding a Bachelor diploma increases the wage by 9.87 percent 
more for an immigrant than for a native-born Canadian. In the case of holding a Master 
diploma the increase in wage for an immigrant is 14.51 percent higher than for a native-
born Canadian. Finally, for an immigrant in possession of a PhD diploma the wage 
increases by 26.16 percent more compared to a native-born Canadian holding the same 
diploma.  
Our results using the sheepskin approach adopted by Ferrer and Riddell (2004) 
and Alboim, Finnie and Meng (2005) show interesting results regarding the different 
effects of these variables in wages. Like them, we find that by introducing sheepskin 
effects we observe that credentials affect the wage in a different way than schooling does. 
Similarly to Ferrer and Riddell (2004), we find that especially for higher degrees the 
sheepskin effects are more important for immigrants than for native-born. 
On the subject of the returns to Canadian and foreign schooling years, Table 16 
shows these returns are higher for specifications [1] and [2] than for specifications [3] 
and [4], which control for sheepskin effects. However, despite the specification, the 
return to one more year of Canadian schooling is less valued for an immigrant than for a 
native-born Canadian. The coefficients in Table 16 allow seeing that immigrants’ returns 
to Canadian schooling is lower than native-born’ returns with a 5 and 1 percent level of 
confidence for all specifications. Surprisingly, when we allow for different sheepskin 
effects (specification [4]), the return to one more year of Canadian schooling decreases 
for immigrants while increasing for native-born Canadians. This change indicates to us, 
together with the differences in sheepskin effects, that there is a different perception and 
valuation of education for native-born Canadians and immigrants. Furthermore, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that immigrants’ return to one more year of foreign schooling is 
equal to the immigrants’ return to one more year of Canadian schooling for all 
                                                 
13 Testing for native-born in specification [4] we fail to reject the following null hypothesis:  
Master degree = PhD degree 
(4) F(1, 5) = 0.03  Prob > F= 0.8797 
However, when testing the same coefficients for immigrants we reject the following null hypotheses: 
a) Master degree*imm1= PhD degree *imm1 
(4) F(1, 5) =32.72  Prob > F = 0.0023 
b) Master degree + Master degree*imm1= PhD degree + PhD degree*imm1 
(4) F(1, 5) =113.88 Prob > F =0.0001 
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equations14. The fact that the return to foreign schooling seems to have an equal value to 
the returns immigrants receive for Canadian schooling provides evidence that this precise 
form of human capital that is acquired in another country is valued as much as the human 
capital immigrants acquire in Canada.  
Table 16 
Return to Canadian and foreign school years   
Specification 
Return to one more year of Canadian 
schooling 
Return to one more year 
of foreign schooling 
  Canadians Immigrant differential Immigrants 
Eq.1 0.0750 -0.0142 0.0618 
  (0.0034)*** (0.0040)** (0.0034)*** 
Eq.2 0.0750 -0.0141 0.0620 
  (0.0034)*** (0.0041)** (0.0034)*** 
Eq.3 0.0390 -0.0118 0.0297 
  (0.0015)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0020)*** 
Eq.4 0.0427 -0.0250 0.0204 
  (0.0019)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0027)*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Separating schooling in its foreign and Canadian components permits us to 
observe and provide further evidence in the same direction of Schaafsma and Sweetman 
(2001) and Aydemir and Skuterud (2005). Like them, we find differences in the returns to 
Canadian schooling among native-born and immigrants, being lower for the latter. In 
addition, we also find that returns to foreign schooling are not different to the 
immigrants’ returns to Canadian schooling. Nonetheless, sheepskin effects show their 
importance, being the coefficients larger for immigrants the higher the diploma. The fact 
that the results of schooling years are consistently smaller when controlling for sheepskin 
effect for the last two specifications illustrates that assuming constant returns to schooling 
and not controlling for sheepskin effects hides a non-linearity and merges different 
information. Additionally, separating schooling effects from sheepskin effects shows that 
schooling effects are lower for immigrants than for native-born whereas the sheepskin 
                                                 
14 test  shclyrs_can+ shclyrs_can*imm1= shclyrs_foreign   
(1) F(1, 5) = 0.64 Prob > F =  0.4601 
(2) F(1, 5) = 0.67 Prob > F =  0.4502  
(3) F(1, 5) = 3.37 Prob > F =  0.1258   
(4) F(1, 5) = 3.13 Prob > F =  0.1371 
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effects are higher for immigrants, which again is in line with the results from Alboim, 
Finnie and Meng (2005) and Ferrer and Riddell (2004). 
 
6.2. Results from estimating specification 4 with different labor 
market related variables  
 
All estimations given until now use unemployment rate interacting with the immigrant 
dummy to control for period effects. But, since we believe there are other variables that 
might be more informative regarding the labor market and could provide better results to 
control for these period effects, thus changing some estimates, for the remaining of the 
section we use specification [4] together with different labor market related variables to 
check for this possibility. Table 10 presents the results of the three estimations we carried 
out, which use unemployment rate, employment rate and activity rate, respectively, to 
control for period effects for each census.  We present selected estimates in tables 
throughout the explanation and ask only occasionally the reader to see Table 10.   
6.2.1. Cohort effects  
Concerning the arrival cohort effects, Table 17 illustrates that using employment rate and 
activity rate instead of unemployment rate changes the statistical significance, values and 
sign of these coefficients15. More specifically in Table 17, we observe that for 
specification [4.1], which uses unemployment rate, only the 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 
cohorts have a positive sign and the rest have a negative sign. Alternatively, for 
specification [4.2], which uses employment rate, only the 1990-1994 and 1995-2000 
cohorts have negative sign. Conversely, for specification [4.3], which uses activity rate, 
we observe that only the 1990-1994 cohort shows a negative sign. Furthermore, when 
examining the coefficients for each cohort across specifications [4.1] to [4.3], we see that 
for the 1970-1974 cohort there are not large variations. However, when we revise the 
1975-1979 cohort we see that even though all coefficients show a decrease, the values of 
                                                 
15Although not all coefficients are individually statistically significant when testing for joint statistical 
significance we reject the null hypothesis of the following test: 
test   c1975-1979 = 0 c1980-1984 = 0 c1985-1989 =0 c1990-1994 =0 c1995-2000 = 0 
(4,1)  F(5,5) = 187.12  Prob > F = 0.0000 
(4,2)  F(5,5) = 190.49  Prob > F = 0.0000 
(4,3)  F(5,5) = 32.88    Prob > F = 0.0008            
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the coefficients from specification [4.2] and [4.3] more than double the value of 
coefficient of specification [4.1]. In the case of the 1980-1984 cohort we notice that while 
for specification [4.1] the coefficient turns out to be negative, specifications [4.2] and 
[4.3], although decreasing, remain positive. Moreover, for the 1985-1989 cohort the three 
coefficients report a recovery but still, the result from specification [4.1] stays negative 
while coefficients from specifications [4.2] and [4.3] remain positive. Conversely, for the 
1990-1994 cohort we distinguish that for all specifications the coefficients show an 
important decrease and are negative. Nevertheless, the estimate from specification [4.1] 
shows the lowest entry effect relative to immigrants coming before 1970. Lastly, the 
1995-2000 cohort shows a recovery for all specifications but still a negative value for 
specifications [4.1] and [4.2].  
Table 17  
Cohort Effects  
  Eq. 4.1 Eq. 4.2 Eq. 4.3 
1970-1974 0.0864 0.0945 0.0907 
  (0.0140)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0129)***
1975-1979 0.0154 0.0384 0.0434 
  (0.0160) (0.0162)* (0.0148)** 
1980-1984 -0.0141 0.0187 0.0302 
  (0.0235) (0.0212) (0.0195) 
1985-1989 -0.0069 0.0415 0.0656 
  (0.0265) (0.0235) (0.0179)** 
1990-1994 -0.1880 -0.1061 -0.0698 
  (0.0211)*** (0.0282)** (0.0317)* 
1995-2000 -0.1107 -0.0338 0.0274 
  (0.0462)* (0.0396) (0.0407) 
Labor market control variable       
unemployment rate YES NO NO 
employment rate NO YES NO 
Activity rate NO NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The use of different controls for period effects affect the sign, magnitude and 
significance of the entry effects. Nonetheless, despite the labor market control variable, 
all the specifications show the same downturns and upturns. Hence, as regards to cohort 
effects, when using unemployment rate to control for period effects, like Aydemir and 
Skuterud (2005), we find that there has been a deterioration of entry earnings which is in 
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line with the finding of most researchers. However, our results report positive coefficients 
for the 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 cohorts and smaller negative effects for subsequent 
cohorts than the results from Aydemir and Skuterud (2005), which report more important 
and increasing negative effects. Nevertheless, our results, like theirs, show a strong 
deterioration for the 1990-1994 cohort and a recovery for the 1995-2000 cohort. When 
using other market labor related variables, however, we find negative entry effects to be 
not as large and significant as when using unemployment rate.16      
6.2.2. Returns to experience 
In table 18 we can see the estimates relative to Canadian and foreign years of working 
experience. Regarding the return to Canadian years of experience for native-born 
Canadians, we observe that it does not present important changes when using different 
labor market related variables to control for period effects. Table 18 shows that the 
returns to Canadian experience for native-born for all estimations is on average 4.44 
percent. Once more, we can see that for immigrants there is no statistically significant 
difference in the returns to Canadian experience relative to native-born. Nevertheless, 
when looking at the returns to Canadian experience of different arrival cohorts relative to 
the immigrants arriving before 1970, we can observe some similarities and differences 
across specifications. Firstly, we remark for specifications [4.1] to [4.3] that in general 
the returns to Canadian experience for immigrant cohorts between 1970 and 1989 seem 
to be inferior to the returns for immigrants arriving before 1970. Secondly, we see that 
the three specifications follow the same downturns and upturns. Nevertheless, when 
looking at the magnitudes of the coefficients, the specification [4.1] shows larger 
negative values than specifications [4.2] and [4.3].17  
                                                 
16 Differences from our results and others can be explained for many reasons. For instance, we only used 3 
censuses from the 1990’s while Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) also use censuses from the 1980’s. 
Moreover, for our research, we use the Public users micro files, which have only a sample of the population 
and have variables  that are top coded or grouped whereas Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) have access to the 
complete census files and less coding restrictions which could provoke miss-measurement biases in our 
results.  Others source of differences are that we limit the scope of our research to investigate sheepskin 
effects and the sensibility of the results due to changes in the labor market related variable while Aydemir 
and Skuterud (2005) follow Green and Worswick (2003) in order to control for entry effects for native-born 
Canadians.   
17 After performing a Wald test of joint significance for the three specifications we reject the null 
hypothesis at 1 percent  for specifications 4,1 and 4,2 and at 10 percent for 4,3 of the following test: 
test can_exp*c1975-1979*imm1 = 0 can_exp*c1980-1984*imm1 = 0 can_exp*c1985-1989*imm1 = 0  
can_exp*c1990-1994*imm1 = 0 can_exp*c1995-2000*imm1 = 0 
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Table 18  
Returns to Canadian and Foreign Experience 
  Eq.4.1 Eq.4.2 Eq.4.3 
Canadian experience 0.0441 0.0444 0.0448 
  (0.0014)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0014)*** 
Canadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0050 -0.0029 -0.0025 
  (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0036) 
Canadian experienceX1970-1974Ximmigrant -0.0051 -0.0046 -0.0036 
  (0.0005)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0005)*** 
Canadian experienceX1975-1979Ximmigrant -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0006 
  (0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0003) 
Canadian experienceX1980-1984Ximmigrant -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0002 
  (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
Canadian experienceX1985_1989Ximmigrant -0.0065 -0.0063 -0.0044 
  (0.0017)** (0.0020)** (0.0018)* 
Canadian experienceX1990-1994Ximmigrant 0.0081 0.0050 0.0073 
  (0.0038)* (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Canadian experienceX1995_2000Ximmigrant 0.0051 0.0020 0.0023 
  (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Canadian experience2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Canadian experience2Ximmigrant 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ForeignXCanadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Foreign experienceXimmigrant 0.0121 0.0118 0.0114 
  (0.0007)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0007)*** 
Foreign experience2Ximmigrant -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Labor market control variable       
Unemployment rate YES NO NO 
employment rate NO YES NO 
activity rate NO NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
In this sense, the use of different labor market related variables to control for period 
effects is affecting the magnitude of the coefficients and the statistical significance but 
not the patterns of deterioration (and recovery).  
With regards to the foreign experience coefficients in Table 18, we observe these 
being statistically significant in all specifications and although the specifications [4.2] 
                                                                                                                                                 
(4,1)  F(5,5) = 190.58  Prob > F = 0.0000 
(4,2)  F(5,5) = 454.39  Prob > F = 0.0000 
(4,3)  F(5,5) =     4.34  Prob > F = 0.0666 
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and [4.3] show slightly lower returns than specification [4.1], the differences are very 
tiny. In general we detect that returns to foreign experience are in all cases small 
compared to immigrants’ returns to Canadian experience18. So, despite the changes in 
labor market control variables, we still observe foreign experience has a lower impact in 
wages than Canadian experience for immigrants. 
6.2.3. Returns to schooling 
As to the coefficients of returns to schooling for specifications [4.1], [4.2] and [4.3], 
Table 20 summarizes the results. We observe that the return to one more year of 
Canadian schooling for native-born when using unemployment rate (specification [4.1]) 
or employment rate (specification [4.2]) is around 4.26 percent while for the estimation 
using activity rate (specification [4.3]) the return is slightly higher. Conversely, for 
immigrants the returns for Canadian schooling in specification [4.1] are about 1.77 
percent whereas for specification 4.2 they are 1.98 percent and finally for specification 
[4.3] they are 2.18 percent. Thus, when changing the labor market control variable we 
observe immigrants’ returns to Canadian schooling increase. For instance, while for 
specification [4.1] immigrants’ returns to Canadian schooling represent about 41.41 
percent of the returns to a native-born, for specification [4.2] these represent 46.48 
percent and for [4.3] these represent 50.20 percent. Finally, when we revise the return of 
one more year of foreign schooling, we notice that these returns only present tinny 
increases when changing the labor market control variable from unemployment rate to 
employment rate or activity rate. Finally, although it seems that foreign returns are higher 
than Canadian returns for immigrants, when testing for this possibility we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of equality19.  
 
                                                 
18 After performing a Wald test we reject the null hypothesis for all specifications of the following premise: 
Test  canadian_exp+canadian_exp*imm1=foreign_exp 
(4,1) F(1,5) =  113.49  Prob > F = 0.0001 
(4,2) F(1,5) =  187.65  Prob > F = 0.0000 
(4,3) F(1,5) =  150.65  Prob > F = 0.0001   
19 When testing equal immigrants’ returns to Canadian schooling and foreign schooling, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis: test shclyrs_can+ shclyrs_can*imm1= shclyrs_foreign  
(4.1) F(1,5) = 3.13  Prob > F = 0.1371 
(4.2) F(1,5) = 0.33  Prob > F = 0.5899 
(4.3) F(1,5) = 0.96  Prob > F = 0.3727 
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Table 19 
Return to Canadian and foreign school years  
  
  
Return to one more year of 
Canadian schooling 
return to one more year of 
foreign schooling 
Labor market control 
variable 
  Canadians Immigrant differential Immigrants   
Eq.4.1 0.0427 -0.0250 0.0204 Unemployment rate 
  (0.0019)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0027)***   
Eq.4.2 0.0426 -0.0228 0.0205 Employment rate 
  (0.0018)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0028)***   
Eq.4.3 0.0433 -0.0216 0.0207 Activity rate  
  (0.0018)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0029)***  
Robust standard errors in parentesis    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
In general all these results indeed show some evidence about the importance of 
the labor market related variable used to control period effects. As we have seen, using 
different variables changes the magnitude of some coefficients while for others it changes 
not only the magnitude but also the sign and the significance. However, despite the 
results presented here support the evidence of different informative characteristic from 
the unemployment, employment and activity rates, we are not able to distinguish to what 
extent employment and activity rates are better controls than unemployment rate. 
Nevertheless, the information that the employment rate and the activity rate give about 
the availability of jobs, the adequacy amongst the skills supplied by native-born and 
immigrants and the accessible jobs, should be considered in further studies that attempt to 
control for period effects.  
 
7. CONCLUSION  
 
In this study we explore the returns to schooling, sheepskin effects and experience of 
immigrants applying a variation to specification used by Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) 
that allows separating the variables of education and experience in their Canadian and 
foreign components. Our research takes a different path and introduces the sheepskin 
approach from Ferrer and Riddell (2004) and Alboim, Naomi, Ross Finnie, and Ronald 
Meng (2005) as well as different labor market related variables to control for period 
effects. Additionally, we limit our study to the 1991, 1996 and 2001 censuses while 
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Ferrer and Riddell (2004) and Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) among others also use the 
1980’s censuses. Nonetheless these differences and our data limitation to the 1990’s 
censuses, our results are consistent with the literature. They show that regarding 
experience, the return of one more year of Canadian experience is not lower for 
immigrants than for native-born Canadians. Nonetheless, when we allow different 
assimilation patterns for Canadian experience and include sheepskin effects, we observe 
deterioration in the returns to Canadian experience relative to the returns for immigrants 
arriving before 1970. We also observe a recovery in these returns for the two most recent 
cohorts (1990-1994 and 1995-2000), where the return to one more year of Canadian 
experience approaches the return of Canadian experience for immigrants arriving before 
1970. On the other hand, the return to foreign experience for immigrants is small 
compared to the returns to Canadian experience. Thus, our evidence plus the results 
collected in the researches of Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) and Aydemir and 
Skuterud (2005) point out that returns to foreign experience are tiny, thus indicating a 
low transferability of this kind of human capital. Furthermore, the estimates concerning 
region of origin support the conclusions of Bloom, Gernier and Gunderson (1995) Green 
and Worswick (2003, 2004), Ferrer and Riddell (2004),  Sweetman (2004) and Aydemir 
and Skuterud (2005) among others regarding the negative effects on wages from the shift 
of traditional source countries to non-traditional source countries, particularly from Asia 
and Latin America. Additionally, separating schooling effects from sheepskin effects 
shows that  returns to Canadian schooling are lower for immigrants than for native-born 
whereas the sheepskin effects are higher for immigrants, which again is in line with the 
results from Alboim, Finnie and Meng (2005) and Ferrer and Riddell (2004). 
Furthermore, the fact of separating schooling in its foreign and Canadian components 
permits us to observe and provide further evidence in the direction of Schaafsma and 
Sweetman (2001) and Aydemir and Skuterud (2005). Like them, we find differences in 
the returns to Canadian schooling among native-born and immigrants, being lower for the 
latter. In addition, we also notice that returns to foreign schooling are not different to 
immigrants’ returns to Canadian schooling across all specifications.  
On the subject of sheepskin effects, we detect that diplomas have an important 
effect on wages of natives and immigrants. Moreover, when allowing interactions of 
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sheepskin effects with the immigration dummy, we observe that for immigrants the 
sheepskin effects are remarkably large for university diplomas. Although for native-born 
we find no significant difference between the sheepskin effect of a master diploma and a 
PhD, for immigrants we do find statistically different sheepskin effects at these levels.  
 As regards to cohort effects, when using unemployment rate to control for period 
effects like Aydemir and Skuterud (2005), we find that there has been a deterioration of 
entry earnings which is in line with the finding of most researches. Specifically, we find 
results showing a strong deterioration for the 1990-1994 cohort and a recovery for the 
most recent 1995-2000 cohort. However, when using other market labor related variables 
we find negative entry effects to be not as large and significant as when using 
unemployment rate. Additionally, we observe that when using unemployment, 
employment and activity rates to control for period effects, results change notably 
regarding estimates for province, cohorts and experience. Our results are an attempt to 
encourage their use. Thus, we believe these variables should be employed in further 
research. Nevertheless, since this study only uses the Public User Micro-data Files from 
the last three Canadian censuses to construct a pooled sample, additional studies using 
more censuses and more precision in some socio-economic and demographic variables 
are needed.  
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8. TABLES  
 
 
 
Table 1 
  Sample Means by immigrant status 
Variable Canadians  Immigrants 
       
Earnings      
log (weekly wage)(*) 6.6912  6.6640 
  (0.6604) (0.7128) 
      
Potential experience years      
years of Canadian experience  20.4897  17.0644 
  (10.7796) (10.3876) 
years of foreign experience    6.9807 
    (8.0500) 
Canadian experience2  536.0264 399.0938 
  (504.0554) (407.4315) 
Foreign experience2   113.5310 
    (221.7315) 
Foreign experience*Canadian experience    95.4346 
    (124.7745) 
      
Schooling years      
Canadian schooling years  13.0709  2.9719 
  (2.7090) (5.0917) 
foreign schooling years    10.4093 
    (5.5590) 
      
Highest degree or diploma      
No diploma 0.2113  0.2118 
  (0.4082) (0.4086) 
secondary diploma 0.2380 0.1742 
  (0.4259) (0.3793) 
school of trades diploma 0.1628 0.1556 
  (0.3692) (0.3625) 
collegial diploma 0.1688 0.1541 
  (0.3746) (0.3610) 
University certificate 0.0214 0.0311 
  (0.1449) (0.1736) 
bachelor degree 0.1538 0.1793 
  (0.3607) (0.3836) 
Master degree 0.0369 0.0654 
  (0.1884) (0.2472) 
PhD degree 0.0070 0.0286 
  (0.0835)  (0.1666) 
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(Table 1 continues…)   
  Sample Means by immigrant status 
Variable Canadians  Immigrants 
       
Province of residence      
Ontario 0.3974  0.5987 
  (0.4894) (0.4902) 
Quebec 0.2905 0.1168 
  (0.4540) (0.3212) 
Manitoba 0.0464 0.0312 
  (0.2103) (0.1737) 
Saskatchewan 0.0375 0.0097 
  (0.1900) (0.0978) 
Alberta 0.1133 0.0910 
  (0.3169) (0.2876) 
British Columbia 0.1150 0.1527 
 (0.3190)  (0.3597) 
      
Other characteristics       
Age 39.5606 43.4263 
  (10.1069) (10.3946) 
Metropolitan area 0.6469 0.8793 
  (0.4779) (0.3258) 
Married 0.6275 0.7685 
  (0.4835) (0.4218) 
      
Knowledge of official languages      
Knowledge of English 0.6394  0.8242 
  (0.4802) (0.3807) 
Knowledge of French 0.1252 0.0208 
  (0.3309) (0.1429) 
Knowledge of both 0.2354 0.1353 
  (0.4243) (0.3421) 
Knowledge of neither 0.0000 0.0197 
  (0.0000) (0.1389) 
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(Table 1 continues…)  
  Sample Means by immigrant status 
Variable Canadians  Immigrants 
Region of birth      
US-England    0.2050 
    (0.4037) 
Europe   0.3438 
    (0.4750) 
Asia   0.2779 
    (0.4480) 
Africa   0.0492 
    (0.2162) 
Latin-America   0.1138 
    (0.3176) 
other regions   0.0103 
    (0.1011) 
      
Immigration cohort      
Before 1970    0.3067 
    (0.4611) 
1970 - 1974   0.1398 
    (0.3468) 
1975 - 1979   0.1935 
    (0.3951) 
1980 - 1984   0.0900 
    (0.2861) 
1985 - 1989   0.1264 
    (0.3323) 
1990 - 1994   0.0954 
    (0.2938) 
1995 - 2000   0.0482 
    (0.2142) 
       
Observations 195,348  48,699 
(*) based on wages at constant prices (index, 2000=100)   
Standard Errors in parenthesis    
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Table 2 
Schooling by immigrant status and Census year (%)  (Males) 
   Census 1991  Census 1996  Census 2001 
Schooling Canadian immigrant Canadian immigrant Canadian immigrant 
No schooling 2.27 4.64 1.95 4.41 1.58 3.84 
Primary 11.86 13.3 10 11.12 8.14 8.93 
Secondary 27.61 16.36 26.24 15.96 23.62 13.96 
College 28.64 25.21 29.14 24.97 30.82 25.39 
University 22.93 28.72 25.29 30.77 26.94 31.81 
Pos-university 6.69 11.76 7.38 12.77 8.9 16.07 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Estimated by the author with data from the 
1991, 1996 & 2001 Canadian Censuses  
 
 
Table 3 
Highest degree by immigrant status and Census year (%) (Males) 
  Census 1991 Census 1996 Census 2001 
Highest diploma Canadian  Immigrant Canadian Immigrant Canadian Immigrant  
No diploma 40.93 36.41 37.76 33.15 34.65 29.77 
Secondary 22.09 18.12 22.22 18.04 22.75 18.66 
School of trades 14.23 15.74 13.86 14.01 14.46 12.87 
Collegial 9.56 10.05 11.64 12.19 12.64 11.79 
University certif. 1.45 2.29 1.65 2.95 1.72 3.21 
Bachelor 9.44 12.06 10.22 13.57 10.93 16.18 
Master 1.95 3.85 2.20 4.31 2.41 5.44 
PhD 0.37 1.47 0.44 1.79 0.45 2.08 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Estimated by the author with data from the 
1991, 1996 & 2001 Canadian Censuses  
 
 
Table 4 
Knowledge of official languages by immigrant status and Census year (%) (Males) 
   Census 1991  Census 1996  Census 2001 
languages Canadian  Immigrant  Canadian Immigrant Canadian Immigrant  
English 65.57 79.48 65.61 78.83 66.09 79.21 
French 16.47 3.46 15.69 3.44 14.7 3.13 
Both 17.6 12.52 18.27 12.42 18.89 12.89 
Neither 0.36 4.54 0.43 5.31 0.32 4.77 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Estimated by the author with data from the 
1991, 1996 & 2001 Canadian Censuses  
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Table 5 
Immigrants by birth region and Census year (%)(Males)
Birth region 
Census 
1991 
Census 
1996 
Census 
2001 
US-England 20.88 17.20 14.14
Europe 39.48 34.92 31.78
Asia 24.68 31.56 37.21
Africa 4.30 4,92 5,64
Latin-America 9.85 10,53 10,33
Others 0.81 0.87 0.89
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Estimated by the author with data from the 
1991, 1996 & 2001 Canadian Censuses  
 
 
 
Table 6 
Sample average weekly wages by schooling, immigrant status and census year 
  1991 1996 2001 
Schooling Canadian immigrant Canadian immigrant Canadian immigrant 
no_schooling 599.90 690.21 629.55 611.57 609.63 595.85 
Primary 722.53 738.52 712.57 693.71 696.55 716.87 
Secondary 798.91 744.14 770.70 723.91 771.00 735.94 
College 861.28 855.91 843.89 792.80 840.78 796.37 
University 1025.97 1027.98 1022.25 981.03 1070.47 1007.49 
Pos-university 1251.01 1261.54 1236.34 1216.94 1279.36 1210.06 
Source: Estimated by the author with sample data from the 
1991, 1996 & 2001 Canadian Censuses at constant prices (base year 2000) 
 
 
Table 7 
Sample average weekly wages by highest degree, immigrant status and census year 
Highest 1991 1996 2001 
Diploma Canadian immigrant Canadian immigrant Canadian immigrant 
No diploma 631.63 606.98 689.67 635.52 756.23 702.92 
Secondary 708.42 677.00 765.03 696.82 836.68 773.46 
School of trades 734.69 765.59 822.69 819.42 903.79 913.69 
Collegial 782.41 831.66 870.64 864.07 988.53 969.41 
University certif. 896.67 839.94 973.14 868.29 1119.03 920.43 
Bachelor 989.40 965.85 1091.70 1029.60 1287.80 1149.39 
Master 1145.63 1064.62 1273.34 1187.63 1482.45 1283.70 
PhD_d 1226.71 1290.56 1351.12 1341.04 1508.80 1492.30 
Source: Estimated by the author with sample data from the 
1991, 1996 & 2001 Canadian Censuses at constant prices (base year 2000) 
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Table 8 
Sample average weekly wages by region of 
origin and census year 
Region of origin 1991 1996 2001
Canada 934.36 934.77 967.34
US-England 1147.84 1152.79 1194.98
Europe 959.81 951.69 991.74
Asia 822.14 778.49 842.12
Africa 957.38 919.64 962.63
Latin-America 790.27 767.34 800.10
Others 976.04 882.61 998.44
Source: Estimated by the author with sample data from the 
1991, 1996 & 2001 Canadian Censuses at constant prices (base year 2000) 
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Table 9 
 Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
 log(weekly wage) log(weekly wage) log(weekly wage) log(weekly wage) 
Immigration status     
Immigrant 0.475486 0.4096334 0.3789304 0.5290844 
 (0.1050490)*** (0.1034589)** (0.0957303)** (0.1040340)*** 
Potential Experience     
Canadian experience 0.0430807 0.0430809 0.044148 0.0441039 
 (0.0013929)*** (0.0013935)*** (0.0013783)*** (0.0013870)*** 
Canadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0081983 -0.0037758 -0.004998 -0.0050084 
 (0.0032680)* (0.0030631) (0.0032807) (0.0034019) 
Foreign experienceXimmigrant 0.0111269 0.0110702 0.0119775 0.0121192 
 (0.0009180)*** (0.0009440)*** (0.0007928)*** (0.0006937)*** 
Canadian experience2 -0.0006428 -0.0006428 -0.0006884 -0.0006834 
 (0.0000412)*** (0.0000412)*** (0.0000388)*** (0.0000383)*** 
Canadian experience2Ximmigrant 0.0000658 -0.0000027 0.0000379 0.0000296 
 (0.0000723) (0.0000704) (0.0000708) (0.0000726) 
Foreign experience2Ximmigrant -0.000254 -0.0002546 -0.0002824 -0.0002905 
 (0.0000497)*** (0.0000501)*** (0.0000447)*** (0.0000419)*** 
ForeignXCanadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0003191 -0.0003118 -0.0004536 -0.0005026 
 (0.0000405)*** (0.0000442)*** (0.0000317)*** (0.0000314)*** 
Schooling years     
Canadian school years 0.0750454 0.0750465 0.0390367 0.0427388 
 (0.0034173)*** (0.0034164)*** (0.0014916)*** (0.0018676)*** 
Canadian school yearscXimmigrant -0.0142219 -0.0140764 -0.0117967 -0.025038 
 (0.0040118)** (0.0040674)** (0.0029146)*** (0.0044998)*** 
Foreign shool yearsXimmigrant 0.0618308 0.0619596 0.0297361 0.0203628 
 (0.0033871)*** (0.0033828)*** (0.0020402)*** (0.0027159)*** 
Province of residence     
Quebec -0.1169045 -0.1167184 -0.1135841 -0.1133766 
 (0.0137022)*** (0.0137354)*** (0.0155910)*** (0.0154205)*** 
Manitoba -0.1654308 -0.1653739 -0.1639273 -0.1641436 
 (0.0035170)*** (0.0035238)*** (0.0033940)*** (0.0033829)*** 
Saskatchewan -0.154914 -0.154891 -0.1539968 -0.1544714 
 (0.0074184)*** (0.0073893)*** (0.0072303)*** (0.0072380)*** 
Alberta -0.0359719 -0.0359903 -0.029257 -0.0299089 
 (0.0041088)*** (0.0041303)*** (0.0041948)*** (0.0042570)*** 
British columbia -0.0147425 -0.0146507 -0.0064007 -0.0063804 
 (0.0070880)* (0.0071491)* (0.0076128) (0.0075564) 
Living in urban area and marital status     
Metropolitan area 0.0859579 0.0859056 0.0798378 0.0802741 
 (0.0187863)*** (0.0187826)*** (0.0190464)*** (0.0191795)*** 
Married 0.1874859 0.1874611 0.1802386 0.1800489 
 (0.0104823)*** (0.0104718)*** (0.0097750)*** (0.0098848)*** 
Knowledge of official languages     
French -0.0660959 -0.0661397 -0.0809824 -0.0807558 
 (0.0157173)*** (0.0156368)*** (0.0144780)*** (0.0139952)*** 
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(Table 9 continues…)     
Both 0.0383226 0.0382932 0.0175788 0.0176356 
 (0.0074129)*** (0.0073923)*** (0.0073717)* (0.0067800)** 
Neither -0.0721125 -0.0712956 -0.0907016 -0.0999973 
 (0.0175432)*** (0.0171659)*** (0.0200750)*** (0.0204764)*** 
Region of origin     
Europe -0.093373 -0.0939296 -0.0976189 -0.1006846 
 (0.0148293)*** (0.0143931)*** (0.0174872)*** (0.0174577)*** 
Asia -0.2507057 -0.2509272 -0.2665361 -0.269297 
 (0.0062918)*** (0.0061720)*** (0.0092448)*** (0.0110316)*** 
Africa -0.1846593 -0.1849718 -0.1954825 -0.198162 
 (0.0202648)*** (0.0200442)*** (0.0232830)*** (0.0244712)*** 
Latin-America -0.2542993 -0.2536614 -0.2419178 -0.23766 
 (0.0257443)*** (0.0255406)*** (0.0235320)*** (0.0229122)*** 
Other region -0.054994 -0.0534913 -0.0456871 -0.0416918 
 (0.0455520) (0.0457251) (0.0387751) (0.0365584) 
Arrival cohorts and interactions     
1970-1974Ximmigrant -0.015613 0.0921053 0.0878406 0.0863636 
 (0.0133785) (0.0186922)*** (0.0147259)*** (0.0140230)*** 
1975-1979Ximmigrant -0.0313334 0.0151721 0.0134045 0.015376 
 (0.0177945) (0.0190349) (0.0164212) (0.0159823) 
1980-1984Xmmigrant -0.0586445 -0.0038274 -0.0127919 -0.0140845 
 (0.0238712)* (0.0238874) (0.0219967) (0.0234758) 
1985-1989Ximmigrant -0.0768182 0.0177774 -0.002821 -0.0068527 
 (0.0334978)* (0.0286862) (0.0256851) (0.0264720) 
1990-1994Ximmigrant -0.1639367 -0.1509315 -0.1808524 -0.187973 
 (0.0245238)*** (0.0248640)*** (0.0205285)*** (0.0210633)*** 
1995-2000Ximmigrant -0.0966042 -0.0437321 -0.0949985 -0.1106869 
 (0.0304659)** (0.0412847) (0.0423511)* (0.0461700)* 
Canadian experienceX1970-1974Ximmigrant  -0.0049958 -0.0050478 -0.0050602 
  (0.0006276)*** (0.0005268)*** (0.0005444)*** 
Canadian experienceX1975-1979Ximmigrant  -0.0020247 -0.0019558 -0.0020407 
  (0.0003859)*** (0.0003980)*** (0.0004187)*** 
Canadian experienceX1980-1984Ximmigrant  -0.0025961 -0.0022951 -0.002267 
  (0.0009941)** (0.0012023) (0.0013073) 
Canadian experienceX1985-1989Ximmigrant  -0.0075399 -0.0066583 -0.0065029 
  (0.0012075)*** (0.0015707)*** (0.0017019)** 
Canadian experienceX1990-1994Ximmigrant  0.0055907 0.0075483 0.0080974 
  (0.0036654) (0.0037143)* (0.0037805)* 
Canadian experienceX1995_2000Ximmigrant  0.0006571 0.0038665 0.0051184 
  (0.0095665) (0.0089687) (0.0088601) 
Diplomas and interactions     
Secondary    0.0673904 0.068551 
   (0.0044641)*** (0.0040447)*** 
School of trades   0.1182988 0.1107573 
   (0.0097518)*** (0.0103901)*** 
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(Table 9 continues…)     
College    0.1722678 0.1588403 
   (0.0186716)*** (0.0246099)*** 
University certificate   0.1948963 0.1892208 
   (0.0282901)*** (0.0294069)*** 
Bachelor   0.3289443 0.3040937 
   (0.0226160)*** (0.0250915)*** 
Master   0.3703099 0.3294834 
   (0.0274464)*** (0.0318596)*** 
PhD   0.4411679 0.3334241 
   (0.0258213)*** (0.0477652)*** 
Secondary diplomaXimmigrant    -0.0189688 
    (0.0199591) 
School of tradesXimmigrant    0.0360156 
    (0.0126680)** 
CollegeXimmigrant    0.0558435 
    (0.0255129)* 
University certificateXimmigrant    0.0267437 
    (0.0240355) 
BachelorXimmigrant    0.0986741 
    (0.0228219)*** 
Master degreeXimmigrant     0.1451256 
    (0.0230383)*** 
PhDXimmigrant    0.2615553 
    (0.0396449)*** 
Labor market related variable     
Unemployment rate 0.0072992 0.0072771 0.0065102 0.0066396 
 (0.0039498) (0.0039562) (0.0041029) (0.0040547) 
Unemployment rateXimmigrant -0.0097693 -0.0099428 -0.0104171 -0.0112163 
 (0.0023084)*** (0.0023343)*** (0.0026139)** (0.0029077)** 
     
Constant 4.9881189 4.9882889 5.3447747 5.3027084 
 (0.0647721)*** (0.0646643)*** (0.0515744)*** (0.0534921)*** 
Observations 244047 244047 244047 244047 
R-squared 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
The excluded categories for all regressions are: province: Ontario; Cohort: before 1970; Highest Degree: no diploma; Knowledge of 
Official Language: English; Civil status: Not married. The dependent variable is log weekly wage at constant prices of 2000. Sample 
is limited to fulltime male workers persons between 20-65 years old with positive wage that have worked at least 30 hours per week 
and 52 weeks per year in the reference year. Only permanent residents living in Quebec, Ontario and the western provinces were 
included in the group.  
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Table 10 
 Eq.4.1 Eq.4.2 4 3  
 log(weekly wage) log(weekly wage) log(weekly wage) 
Immigration status    
Immigrant 0.5290844 0.2424131 0.3680987 
 (0.1040340)*** (0.2256192) (0.2170860) 
Potential Experience    
Canadian expericne 0.0441039 0.0443624 0.0447727 
 (0.0013870)*** (0.0015459)*** (0.0014287)*** 
Canadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0050084 -0.0029051 -0.0025117 
 (0.0034019) (0.0032753) (0.0035854) 
Foreign experienceXimmigrant 0.0121192 0.0118004 0.0114128 
 (0.0006937)*** (0.0007275)*** (0.0007283)*** 
Canadian experience2  -0.0006834 -0.0006874 -0.0006924 
 (0.0000383)*** (0.0000405)*** (0.0000391)*** 
Canadian experience2Ximmigrant 0.0000296 0.0000164 0.0000302 
 (0.0000726) (0.0000749) (0.0000751) 
Foreign_experience2Ximmigrant -0.0002905 -0.0002867 -0.0002798 
 (0.0000419)*** (0.0000421)*** (0.0000419)*** 
ForeignXCanadian experienceXimmigrant -0.0005026 -0.0004874 -0.0004726 
 (0.0000314)*** (0.0000331)*** (0.0000349)*** 
Schooling years    
Canadian school years 0.0427388 0.0426343 0.0433364 
 (0.0018676)*** (0.0018484)*** (0.0018232)*** 
Canadian school yearsXimmigrant -0.025038 -0.0228178 -0.0215785 
 (0.0044998)*** (0.0042256)*** (0.0046899)*** 
Foreign school yearsXimmigrant 0.0203628 0.020493 0.0206569 
 (0.0027159)*** (0.0027895)*** (0.0028795)*** 
Province of residence    
Quebec -0.1133766 -0.0623368 -0.0729128 
 (0.0154205)*** (0.0137262)*** (0.0093696)*** 
Manitoba -0.1641436 -0.1615411 -0.1616728 
 (0.0033829)*** (0.0032312)*** (0.0027929)*** 
Saskatchewan -0.1544714 -0.181426 -0.1823214 
 (0.0072380)*** (0.0081927)*** (0.0091847)*** 
Alberta -0.0299089 -0.0939951 -0.1110107 
 (0.0042570)*** (0.0078137)*** (0.0113468)*** 
British Columbia -0.0063804 0.0254703 0.0184055 
 -0.0075564 (0.0039371)*** (0.0006965)*** 
Living in urban area and marital status    
Metropolitan area 0.0802741 0.0458835 0.0429745 
 (0.0191795)*** (0.0260958) (0.0259690) 
Married 0.1800489 0.1802503 0.1768015 
 (0.0098848)*** (0.0094097)*** (0.0105797)*** 
Knowledge of official languages    
French -0.0807558 -0.0707281 -0.0705499 
 (0.0139952)*** (0.0129927)*** (0.0122330)*** 
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(Table 10 continues…)    
Both 0.0176356 0.0168025 0.016365 
 (0.0067800)** (0.0078268)* (0.0080613)* 
Neither -0.0999973 -0.0986953 -0.0981423 
 (0.0204764)*** (0.0206642)*** (0.0211473)*** 
Region of origin    
Europe -0.1006846 -0.1027562 -0.1042223 
 (0.0174577)*** (0.0179295)*** (0.0173063)*** 
Asia -0.269297 -0.2702423 -0.2694235 
 (0.0110316)*** (0.0112581)*** (0.0111418)*** 
Africa -0.198162 -0.2012857 -0.2014301 
 (0.0244712)*** (0.0256926)*** (0.0258228)*** 
Latin-America -0.23766 -0.2397863 -0.2402122 
 (0.0229122)*** (0.0241652)*** (0.0247181)*** 
Other region -0.0416918 -0.0442073 -0.0423675 
 (0.0365584) (0.0364101) (0.0368429) 
Arrival cohorts and interactions    
1970_1974Ximmigrant 0.0863636 0.0945155 0.0907491 
 (0.0140230)*** (0.0130785)*** (0.0128513)*** 
1975_1979 Ximmigrant 0.015376 0.0383587 0.0434067 
 (0.0159823) (0.0161787)* (0.0147556)** 
1980_1984 Ximmigrant -0.0140845 0.018673 0.0301602 
 (0.0234758) (0.0212337) (0.0194936) 
1985_1989 Ximmigrant -0.0068527 0.0414598 0.0656014 
 (0.0264720) (0.0234575) (0.0179253)** 
1990_1994 Ximmigrant -0.187973 -0.1061264 -0.0697731 
 (0.0210633)*** (0.0282167)** (0.0317397)* 
1995_2000 Ximmigrant -0.1106869 -0.0337887 0.0273635 
 (0.0461700)* -0.039561 (0.0407145) 
Canadian experienceX1970-1974Ximmigrant -0.0050602 -0.004576 -0.003596 
 (0.0005444)*** (0.0004108)*** (0.0005074)*** 
Canadian experienceX1975-1979Ximmigrant -0.0020407 -0.0017465 -0.0005653 
 (0.0004187)*** (0.0004292)*** (0.0003121) 
Canadian experienceX1980-1984Ximmigrant -0.002267 -0.0018466 -0.0002072 
 (0.0013073) (0.0015120) (0.0014319) 
Canadian experienceX1985-1989Ximmigrant -0.0065029 -0.0062733 -0.0043501 
 (0.0017019)** (0.0019721)** (0.0018029)* 
Canadian experienceX1990-1994Ximmigrant 0.0080974 0.0049811 0.007314 
 (0.0037805)* (0.0040628) (0.0037574) 
Canadian experienceX1995-2000Ximmigrant 0.0051184 0.0019561 0.0022623 
 (0.0088601) (0.0094615) (0.0094713) 
Diplomas and interactions    
Secondary 0.068551 0.0695341 0.0704239 
 (0.0040447)*** (0.0044778)*** (0.0048575)*** 
School of trades 0.1107573 0.1119178 0.1124221 
 (0.0103901)*** (0.0102812)*** (0.0106425)*** 
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(Table 10 continues…)    
College 0.1588403 0.1603996 0.161677 
 (0.0246099)*** (0.0249662)*** (0.0257093)*** 
University certificate 0.1892208 0.1909038 0.1904822 
 (0.0294069)*** (0.0302242)*** (0.0302220)*** 
Bachelor 0.3040937 0.3048077 0.3038583 
 (0.0250915)*** (0.0263622)*** (0.0268187)*** 
Master 0.3294834 0.3288616 0.3263288 
 (0.0318596)*** (0.0336315)*** (0.0337808)*** 
PhD 0.3334241 0.3347435 0.3321884 
 (0.0477652)*** (0.0500817)*** (0.0510151)*** 
SecondaryXimmigrant -0.0189688 -0.020667 -0.0212943 
 (0.0199591) (0.0202538) (0.0207462) 
school of tradesXimmigrant 0.0360156 0.035241 0.0351044 
 (0.0126680)** (0.0124425)** (0.0126213)** 
collegeXimmigrant 0.0558435 0.055408 0.0546252 
 (0.0255129)* (0.0258086)* (0.0265020)* 
University certificateXimmigrant 0.0267437 0.0230288 0.0231784 
 (0.0240355) (0.0249122) (0.0256109) 
Bachelor degreeXimmigrant 0.0986741 0.0967897 0.09711 
 (0.0228219)*** (0.0238726)*** (0.0250295)** 
Master degreeXimmigrant 0.1451256 0.1433786 0.1449861 
 (0.0230383)*** (0.0244039)*** (0.0251879)*** 
PhD degreeXimmigrant 0.2615553 0.2592459 0.2613543 
 (0.0396449)*** (0.0424119)*** (0.0438370)*** 
Labor market related variable    
Unemployment rate 0.0066396   
 (0.0040547)   
Unemployment rateXimmigrant -0.0112163   
 (0.0029077)**   
Employment rate  0.0093276  
  (0.0015465)***  
Employment rateXimmigrant  0.0018982  
  (0.0027136)  
Activity rate   0.0132154 
   (0.0015807)*** 
Activity rateXimmigrant   -0.0003398 
   (0.0020771) 
    
Constant 5.3027084 4.7342625 4.3799704 
 (0.0534921)*** (0.1213941)*** (0.0671326)*** 
Observations 244047 244047 244047 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
The excluded categories for all regressions are: province: Ontario; Cohort: before 1970; Highest Degree: no diploma; 
Knowledge of Official Language: English; Civil status: Not married. The dependent variable is log weekly wage at 
constant prices of 2000. Sample is limited to fulltime male workers persons between 20-65 years old with positive 
wage that have worked at least 30 hours per week and 52 weeks per year in the reference year. Only permanent 
residents living in Quebec, Ontario and the western provinces were included in the group.  
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